

HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

VOLUME XI

OCTOBER, 1918

NUMBER 4

THE HINDU YOGA-SYSTEM

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Frederic Palmer's account of Angelus Silesius, published in the April number of this *Review*, portrays admirably the struggles of a German mystic of some three hundred years ago, to attain the unattainable, to give utterance to the unutterable. Three and twenty hundred years ago, the like struggles were making part of the spiritual history of distant India. Perhaps Dr. Palmer's essay may lend a certain timeliness to an endeavor to interest Occidental readers in those sombre followers of the Mystic Way, who — time out of mind — have held retreat for meditation in the solemn stillness of the forests "lapped by the storied Hydaspes."

Our histories of philosophy are wont to begin with Thales of Miletus. But oh, how brief seems all recorded human history, when some geologist tells us the story of the earth's crust, or the astronomer overwhelms us with that of the spiral nebulae! Lilliputian indeed is the difference — whether in time or in place — between Thales and Yājñavalkya, between Miletus and the Ganges. The informing fact remains, that these ultimate questions — answerable only in the language of the great antinomies — do and always will come up,

as far to the West and as far to the East as the blades of grass do spring.

Whom space nor time nor nothing else can bound,
 Who hast nor form (save spirit mere) nor end,
 Whom naught can fathom but Thy thought profound,—
 To Thee, Light, Peace Ineffable, I bend.

Thus Bhartri-hari, calling unto God. It is He — of whom they say “Not, not.”

And if timeliness there be, the attempt is none the less timely, because of the work, recently published by the Harvard Press, and written by my friend and colleague and former pupil, James Haughton Woods (now serving at the Sorbonne as exchange-professor from Harvard), and entitled *The Yoga-system of Patanjali*. It is fitting that the work should be introduced, not only to Indianists, but also and especially to students of the history of psychology and philosophy and religion, by *The Harvard Theological Review*.

The volume, as appears from its title-page, comprises three distinct literary works, translated from Sanskrit into English, namely: the Mnemonic Rules, called Yoga-sūtras, of Patanjali; the Comment, called Yoga-bhāṣya, attributed to Veda-vyāsa; and the Explanation, called Tattva-vāiṣṇarādī, of Vāchaspati Miṣra. It is here in place to point out some of the reasons why these works are worthy of study and some of the ways in which that study may prove interesting and fruitful. But first a word as to what the three works are.

The third, or the Explanation, is of course a commentary on the second, or the Comment. And the Comment is in a way a commentary on the Rules; but it is much more than that, as will appear when we consider what the Rules themselves are. Professor Woods has done well in rendering the Sanskrit word for sūtras by ‘mnemonic rules,’ for that phrase emphasizes the fact that they are primarily, not something that will

give you a clear idea of the Yoga-system, but rather "something to be learned by heart," a set of mental pegs on which to hang, in very close and orderly sequence, the principles and precepts of a thoroughly elaborated system,—which system, however, you must know from other sources than the rules themselves, namely, from the teachers of your "school."

While therefore it is important to understand that the Comment is a posterius to the Rules and that the Rules are a prius to the Comment, it is yet more important to understand that the Rules themselves are a posterius to an elaborated system, of which prior system however no exposition in literary form contemporaneous with that prior system has come down to us in Sanskrit; and that the Comment or Bhāshya, the reinvestiture of the skeleton of the Rules with the flesh and blood of comprehensible details, is accordingly the oldest systematic exposition of Yoga doctrine in Sanskrit that we possess.

Onesikritos, the companion of Alexander the Great, is the first notable foreigner to give us an account of the Yogins of India.¹ Himself a disciple of Diogenes the Cynic, we need not wonder that Alexander selected him as the man most fit to talk with the Hindu ascetic sages and to inquire about their teachings. His report of that memorable interview of 326 B.C. has been preserved for us by Strabo in his Geography (xv.63). Despite the difficulty of conversing through interpreters, Onesikritos was in fact remarkably successful in getting

¹ Possibly Demokritos of Abdera visited them, perhaps a century earlier. According to Clement of Alexandria (Stromata, 1.xv.69), Demokritos maintained that none of his contemporaries had seen more countries and made the acquaintance of more men distinguished in every kind of science than himself. Among those men, Aelian includes the sages of India (τοὺς σοφιστὰς τῶν Ἰνδῶν: *Varia historia*, iv.20); and Diogenes Laertius reports a similar tradition (τοῖς γυμνοσοφισταῖς φασὶ τινες συνμῆξαι αὐτὸν ἐν Ἰνδίᾳ: ix.35). Such a tradition is not to be set aside too lightly, when we consider the views of Demokritos concerning peace of mind (εὐθυμία: ix.45) as the best fruit of philosophy, and the many references thereto in the fragments of his ethical treatises. Had these last been preserved, it is possible that we might have found in them distinctly recognizable traces of Indian teaching.

at some of the very fundamentals of Indian belief. The drift of the talk, he said, came to this, that that is the best doctrine, which rids the spirit not only of grief but also of joy; and again, that that dwelling-place is the best, for which the scantiest equipment or outfit is needed.²

Of these two points, one is of prime significance for the spiritual side of Yoga, just as the other is so for its practical aspects. The one suggests the 'undisturbed calm' (*citta-prasāda*) of Patanjali, the 'mindfulness made perfect through balance' (*upekkhā-sati-pārisuddhi*) of Buddhaghosa; and the other is a concrete instance of the doctrine³ of emancipation from the slavery to things. This latter is a part of the fundamental morality (specifically, neither Brahmanical nor Jainistic nor Buddhist) which is an essential preliminary for any system of ascetic religious training, and is accordingly taught again and again, now with a touch of gentle humor, now sternly, and always cogently, by Brahmans and Jains and Buddhists alike.

Contemporary with Onesikritos, but destined (unlike him) never to be forgotten in India, was Kāuṭilya, "the Hindu Bismarck," as Jacobi calls him, imperial chancellor of Chandragupta or Σανδρόκοττος. His treatise on Statesmanship⁴ is, as Jacobi shows, our most trust-

² Strabo xv.65: τὰ γοῦν λεχθέντα εἰς τοῦτ' ἔφη συντείνειν ὡς εἴη λόγος ἀριστος ὃς ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ψυχῆς ἀφαιρήσεται. . . . καὶ γὰρ οἰκίαν ἀρίστην εἶναι ἥτις ἂν ἐπισκευῆς ἐλαχίστης δέηται.

³ This is beautifully set forth by Buddhaghosa in his great treatise on Buddhism, *The Way of Salvation* or *Visuddhi-magga*. See book 1, sections 105-112, especially 106, in volume 49 of the Proceedings of the American Academy, p. 159. Of all names in the history of Buddhist Scholasticism, Buddhaghosa's is the most illustrious. He is not less renowned in the East than is his contemporary, Saint Augustin, in the West, and for the same reasons,—sanctity of life, wide learning, and great literary achievement. An edition of the Pāli text of this treatise was undertaken by my beloved and unforgotten friend and pupil, the late Henry Clarke Warren. It is my hope to complete his unfinished work, and to issue the text with an English version.

⁴ The recently edited *Arthaśāstra*, published at Mysore, 1909. See the articles by Hillebrandt, Hertel, Jacobi, and Jolly, and especially the three articles by Jacobi, *Berliner Akademie*, 1911 and 1912. He calls it "eine historische Quelle allerersten Ranges" (1911, p. 954: cf. p. 957, and 1912, p. 834).

worthy source of knowledge for the ancient Hindu state, not only because its date (about 300 B.C.) is certain,⁵ but also because it was written by the very man who had the principal part in the foundation and administration of the great and growing empire of the Mauryan Dynasty.⁵ Kāuṭilya says that Sāṅkhya and Yoga and Lokāyata were the three philosophic systems current in his day. Unfortunately, he does not tell us whether there were expositions thereof in literary form. In the centuries (perhaps six or more) between Kāuṭilya and Patanjali, the Yoga-system did probably undergo many modifications in detail; but it is a fact of prime importance that so great an authority as Kāuṭilya recognizes it as a system, and as one of the three most worthy of mention among those current in his day.^{5a}

The elements of Yoga, as Hopkins⁶ observes, are indefinitely antique. The rigorous austerities, the control of the senses, especially as against the temptations of carnal lust,—these are the achievements of holy men which made even the gods to tremble on their thrones. And they are described in the Mahā-bhārata and other narrative works, often with amusingly grotesque exaggeration, but in such an incidental and matter-of-fact way that we cannot doubt that from very early times Yoga-practices were common and wide-spread in India and that the belief in their potency was altogether genuine.

Yoga is accordingly one of the most ancient and striking products of the Hindu mind and character. It is therefore a little strange that, while the labors of Deussen and Garbe and others have done very much to open up the Vedānta and Sāṅkhya systems to the Occident, the

⁵ Berliner Akademie, 1911, p. 954.

^{5a} Ibidem, p. 733.

⁶ In his learned article, Yoga-technique in the Great Epic, *Journal of the Am. Oriental Society* (1901), vol. 22, p. 333-379. To him, my most grateful acknowledgments.

history of Yoga as a body of practices and as a religious-philosophic system is yet to be written.⁷ For the history of Yoga-practice, nothing could be more illuminating and fruitful than to carry further such investigations as those of Hopkins, just cited. For the history of Yoga as a system, the most immediate requirement is evidently an Occidental translation of the *Comment or Yoga-bhāṣya*. It is greatly to the credit of Professor Woods that he realized this need and addressed himself with so much energy to the task of supplying it, the more so when that task involved journeys once and again not only to the great teachers of Europe (Deussen and Jacobi), but also to those of India.

Rājendra-lāla Mitra, in the preface to his *Yoga aphorisms of Patanjali* (1883: p. xc), says: "I had hopes of reading the work with the assistance of a professional Yogī; but I have been disappointed. I could find no Pandit in Bengal who had made Yoga the special subject of his study, and the only person I met at Benares who could help me was most exorbitant in his demands. He cared not for the world and its wealth, and the only condition under which he would teach me was strict pupilage under Hindu rules — living in his hut and ever following his footsteps — to which I could not submit." That was five and thirty years ago. A real command of both Sanskrit and English by the same person is a combination rare enough. Still rarer, the combination of those two elements with a knowledge of one of the great vernaculars of India, such as R. Mitra had. Rarest of all, this triple combination plus the chance (which a foreigner is not likely to get) for a thorough acquaintance with the actual procedure and habit of mind of a genuine Yogin of high character. What fruit might that now perhaps almost impossible combination have borne!

⁷ This, with all due deference to Garbe and his excellent chapters on Yoga in the *Grundriss der Indoarischen Philologie* (1896).

If no Occidental may hope for any such chances of practical acquaintance with Yoga, it is at least needful that the written treatise which serves as the basis of book-study should be informed by the noblest spirit and loftiest purpose. That the Comment or Bhāshya meets these requirements,⁸ none of us, however much or little we sympathize with the Hindu point of view, will, I think, deny. "Find me, and turn thy back on heaven," says Brahma, in Emerson's familiar verses. And so the author of the Comment, in treating (at ii.42) of the supremest happiness, says⁹ that the pleasures of love in this world and the great pleasures of heaven are not worth the sixteenth part of that supremest happiness that comes from the dwindling of lusts.

And again, in like spirit, he speaks at iii.51. First he quaintly describes how the gods tempt an advanced Yogin with the sensual pleasures of their transitory heaven: "Sir, will you sit here? Will you rest here? This pleasure might prove attractive. This maiden might prove attractive. This elixir wards off old age and death." And so on. Then he suggests the Yogin's answer to these enticements, and in so doing he rises to a pitch of sustained and noble eloquence:

Baked on the pitiless coals of the round-of-rebirths, wandering about in the blinding gloom of birth and death,—hardly have I found the lamp that dispels the darkness of the moral defilements, the lamp of Yoga,—when, lo, these lust-born gusts of the things of sense do threaten to put it out! How then could it be that I who have seen its light, tricked by the mirage of the things of sense, should throw myself like fuel into that same fire of the round-of-rebirths as it flares up again? Fare ye well, [things of sense,] like unto dreams are ye! to be pitied are they that crave you, things of sense, [fare well!]

⁸ It is certain that the Gheraṇḍa-saṁhitā, more or less widely known in the Occident, does not meet them. My former pupil, Professor S. K. Belvalkar of Poona, India, assures me that it is condemned by those whose learning and character he respects. The like is true of Haṭhayoga-pradīpikā and numerous similar works.

⁹ Quoting from the Mahā-bhārata, xii.174.46, a stanza of significance and dignity.

Perhaps enough (or more) has already been said to make clear the historical importance and the moral dignity of the Yoga-bhāṣya. Its importance was long ago pointed out by others in other connections: so by Kern in his *History of Buddhism*,¹⁰ by Jacobi in his *Ursprung des Buddhismus aus dem Sāṅkhya-Yoga*,¹¹ and by Senart in his *Bouddhisme et Yoga*,¹² but the appearance of the present translation justifies us in emphasizing the dignity and importance of the original, the more so as it is hoped that this translation of Dr. Woods and the publication of Buddhaghosa's treatise on Buddhism will prove to be a powerful stimulus and aid to the comparative study of these two great systems.

Thus, to instance some of the more striking and well-known coincidences between the Bhāṣya and Buddhism, we may begin with the Four Eminent Truths. The most significant achievement of modern medicine is the finding out of the cause of disease. This is the indispensable foundation for the whole structure of preventive medicine. It was precisely this problem in the world of the spirit to which Buddha addressed himself, the ætiology of human misery. His solution he publicly announced in his first sermon, the gist of which was destined to become known to untold millions, the sermon of the Deer-park at Benares¹³ or sermon about the Four Truths. These concern suffering, its cause, its surcease, and the way thereto, and they coincide with the four cardinal topics of Hindu medical science,¹⁴ disease, the cause of disease, health, and remedies. Now these Four Truths

¹⁰ Jacobi's translation, Leipzig, 1882, vol. 1, p. 467 ff.

¹¹ Göttinger Nachrichten, 1896.

¹² Revue de l'histoire des religions, 1900.

¹³ Vinaya-piṭaka, vol. 1, p. 10; Samyutta-nikāya, vol. 5, p. 420. These Truths become a kind of canonical commonplace: see Majjhima, vol. 1, p. 48.

¹⁴ This coincidence the Hindu medical writers did not fail to observe: so Vāgbhaṭa in the stanza introductory to the Aṣṭāṅga-hṛdaya.

are set forth by the author of the Bhāshya at ii.15, and not without explicit reference to the fact that this Yoga-system has four divisions coincident with those of the system of medicine. It may be added that a part of the Rule to which this is the Comment, reads: To the discriminating, all is nothing but pain, *duḥkham eva sarvaṃ vivekinaḥ*; and that this again is one of the three fundamental axioms of Buddhism,¹⁵ All is transitory, All is pain, All is without substantive reality.

Again, the Bhāshya enumerates (at i.20), quite as a matter-of-course, the five means to the higher concentration, namely faith and energy and mindfulness and concentration and insight (*śraddhā-vīrya-smṛti-samādhi-prajñā*). These are the same five elements of Yoga mastered and taught by the famous Yoga-doctors, Ālāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta, and coincide literally with those given in the Buddhist texts, namely in the Discourse of the Noble Quest or Ariya-pariyesana-sutta, *Majjhima-nikāya*, vol. 1, p. 164. Here Buddha tells how he, before his Enlightenment, went to these teachers, found that he himself had mastered *saddhā*, *virīya*, *sati*, *samādhi*, and *paññā* no less truly than they, and admitted that these things were good as far as they went, but that they brought you only to the third or fourth of the Four Formless Realms, that is, that they did not bring you far enough. The discussion of the proper balance of these five moral faculties constitutes a most interesting section of the fourth book of the *Vi-suddhi-magga*.

Again, among the Forty Businesses or *kammaṭṭhānas*, that play so prominent a rôle in the *Visuddhi-magga*, are the Four Exalted States or *brahma-vihāras*, namely friendliness and compassion and joy and indifference

¹⁵ *Anguttara-nikāya*, vol. 1, p. 286; translated by Henry C. Warren, p. xiv of his *Buddhism in translations*, Harvard Oriental Series, vol. 3. See also *Visuddhi-magga*, book xx.

(mettā, karuṇā, muditā, upekkhā). The whole of book ix is devoted to them. They all lead up to the first three trances, and the cultivation of upekkhā leads even to the fourth trance or highest of the ordinary trances. Now all these four states, under the corresponding names of maitrī, karuṇā, muditā, and upekṣā, are prescribed by the Rule and the Bhāṣhya at i.33, and as a means for calming the mind-stuff.

Or again, to cite a case of partial correspondence and partial diversity, we may mention the kleṣas or innate defects of human nature or moral defilements or (as Dr. Woods calls them) the hindrances. These are enumerated by the Bhāṣhya, at ii.3, as ignorance, the feeling-of-personality, lust, ill-will, and the will-to-live (avidyā, asmitā, rāga, dveṣa, abhiniveṣa). But Buddhaghosa, in book xxii, has a list of ten, containing most of these five, and also, for example, sloth or languor (thīna, styāna), which last by the Bhāṣhya, at i.30, is put among the nine obstacles or antarāyas. We hope that the Bhāṣhya and the Visuddhi-magga may prove mutually illuminating, by reason not only of their coincidences but also of their differences.

Minor coincidences, in matters of diction, as between the Bhāṣhya and the Buddhist texts, deserve careful notice from any who chance to study these sources at the same time. Confident as we may be concerning the influence of the Yoga system upon Buddha,—the interplay of influences as between the Bhāṣhya and the Buddhist texts may well have been chiefly in the opposite direction. Thus the use of the Sanskrit word adhvānam in the sense of 'time' (so at iv.12) is, unless I err, wholly foreign to Brahmanical Sanskrit texts, and is a downright taking over of its Pāli equivalent addhānam in its secondary but common meaning of 'time.' Similarly the use of -nimna with -prāgbhāra (at iv.26) seems to me not rightly Sanskrit at all, but rather a conscious adapta-

tion of the familiar Pāli combination -ninna, -poṇa, -pabbhāra.

Indeed, one is sometimes tempted to surmise that the diction of the author of the Bhāshya was influenced by downright reminiscences of Nikāya texts. Thus at ii.39 and iv.25 are given the questionings or doubts as to personal identity through various past and future births: "Who was I? Or who shall we become?" and so forth: ko 'ham āsam? katham aham āsam? . . . ke vā bhaviṣyāmaḥ? katham vā bhaviṣyāmaḥ? These are substantially the questions cited at length by Buddhaghosa (in book xix) from the Majjhima-nikāya (vol. 1, p. 8).

The reflections of the Yogin "on whom insight has dawned" are put by the author of the Bhāshya (at i.16) in a way which — at once brief and yet ample — is marked by noble dignity. They describe the winning of the supreme goal: "Won is that which was to be won. Ended are the moral defilements which had to be ended. Cut is the close-jointed succession of existences-in-the-world, which — so long as it was not cut asunder — involved death after birth and birth after death." Prāptam prāpaṇīyam. Kṣiṇāḥ kṣetavyāḥ kleṣāḥ. Chinnaḥ clišṭaparvā bhava-saṁkramo, yasyāvicchedāj janitvā mriyate mṛtvā ca jāyate.

In like manner the consummation of the holy life, salvation or the setting free, is described in the Dīghanikāya, vol. 1, p. 84: "In him, when set free, there arises the knowledge that he *is* set free. He knows: Ended is rebirth. Lived has been the holy life. Done has been what was to be done. There is no more returning here." Vimuttasmim 'vimuttam' iti nāṇam hoti. 'Khīṇa jāti. Vusitam brahmacariyam. Kataṁ karaṇīyam. Nāparam itthattāyā' ti pajānāti.

The whole spiritual situation in both cases is similar; and that the substantial coincidences of the two descrip-

tions may be nothing more than the natural outcome of that similarity we will not deny. But the examples that have been mentioned (a few out of many) make it clear that a systematic study of the Bhāṣhya in the light of the Buddhist texts is well worth the while.

The comparison of Yoga and Buddhism is not the only study which I hope this work of Professor Woods will powerfully stimulate. I hope it will direct the attention of scholars to a severely critical examination of the supernormal powers which, as Buddhist and Yoga texts alike maintain, are among the fruits of the cultivation of profound concentration or *samādhi*.

In order to make my meaning clear, let me instance (with added references to the text of the Bhāṣhya) some of these powers: Such are clairvoyance and clairaudience (ii.43); knowledge of the future (iii.16) and of one's previous births (iii.18); thought-reading (iii.19); power to become invisible (iii.21); the cessation of hunger and thirst (iii.30); the power of hypnotic suggestion (iii.38: "your mind-stuff enters the body of another," *cittasya para-ṣarirāveṣaḥ*); the power to walk upon water or a spider's thread or sunbeams or to pass through the air (iii.42); the power by reason of which "the fire, hot as it is, burns you not" (iii.45); and so on. Such powers are systematically treated by Buddhaghosa in books xii and xiii, and are constantly mentioned with quiet gravity by the story-tellers, as if no one were expected to have any difficulty in believing them. Is it not worth while, in the light of modern knowledge, to try to draw a line between that which has some real basis in fact and that which has none? To this question William James, by word and by deed, answered with an emphatic Yes.

The more obvious manifestations of Yoga-practice, such as the standing upon one leg or the holding of one

arm aloft and other austerities, did not fail to strike the Greeks (Strabo xv.61), just as, at all times, the sensational has struck the casual¹⁶ observer. The noblest and most spiritual achievements of the Yogin present no features of interest for the gazer or for the tourist-photographer. On the other hand, the rewards — whether of gratified vanity or of reputation or of gifts — for the successful performance of marvellous or apparently supernormal acts, are and always have been a temptation to abuse Yoga-practices with venal and fraudulent purpose. The ample admixture of deception and trick and miracle-mongering has tended to make men of science averse to any serious consideration of the whole subject. But fraud, even if preponderant, will not excuse us from the due investigation of the residuum of well-attested fact, not even if that residuum be small. The reason why well-attested cases of the apparently miraculous are relatively few is a legitimate one: to persons most likely to make the highest and noblest attainments by the practice of Yoga, the so-called “magical powers” are after all an incidental by-product. And accordingly, Buddhaghosa relegates the discussion of the supernormal powers to those books (xii and xiii) which form a mere appendix to his treatment (books iii to xi) of Concentration or Samādhi. To seek these powers as an end, or to make a display of them to satisfy the curiosity of the vulgar, is wholly unworthy, and indeed most strictly forbidden. In the gospel-narrative of the temptation, when the Devil says, “If thou be the Son of God, cast thyself down from hence,” the answer of Jesus is an uncompromising rebuke. And in like spirit, the Mahā-

¹⁶ Or, to speak in terms of the twentieth century, the “cameral” or “snapshot” observer. The National Geographic Society of Washington devoted most of its Magazine for December, 1913, to the “Religious penances and punishments self-inflicted by the Holy Men of India.” The paper is illustrated with seventy pictures. The sensational aspects of Yoga-practice have been treated in easily accessible works. Such are John C. Oman’s *The Mystics, Ascetics, and Saints of India*, London, 1903; Richard Schmidt’s *Fakire und Fakirtum*, Berlin, 1908.

bhārata threatens with "a hell from which there is no release" the Yogins who are thus guilty.¹⁷

Thought-reading is a power very often ascribed to Buddha or to a saint, who thereby intuitively discerns the evil intentions of another and so thwarts them. In many of these cases the use of good judgment or of a knowledge of human nature may explain the successful thought-reading; while in others some influence much more subtle may be in play. The cases as a class are not easy to sift. On the other hand, the activity of the subliminal consciousness is most clearly referred to in the Explanation to the Bhāshya at i.24: "Chāitra thinks intently, 'Tomorrow I must get up just at day-break,' and then after having slept, he gets up at that very time because of the subliminal impression resulting from that intent thinking." This power of awaking from sound slumber at a predetermined hour is abundantly attested by common experience, and also, for example, by J. M. Bramwell in his *Hypnotism*, page 387 (cf. p. 115). And doubtless the power to "emerge from trance" or "rise out of trance" (one of the five "masteries" of Bud-dhaghosa at book iv, section 103, the *vuṭṭhāna-vasī*) is a power of a kindred nature. If the Bhāshya's promise, "fire burns him not" (at iii.45: see above) refers to insensibility to the pain of a burn, the power therein implied may stand in relation to the facts of anæsthesia and analgesia as recited by Bramwell at pages 360-361. Compare also his *Index*, under "Analgesia, in hypnosis, and post-hypnotic."

Perhaps the most marvellous of all these "supernormal" attainments is the power of suffering one's body to be buried for a long time and of resuming one's normal activities on release from the grave. Well-attested cases are indeed rare, but such in fact there are, and none is better attested or more wonderful than that of Haridās.

¹⁷ At xii.197.7, cited by Hopkins, *Yoga-technique*, JAOS. xxii.344.

This man had himself buried alive for six weeks at Lahore at the Court of Runjeet Singh in 1837. Thorough-going precautions were taken against fraud, and the account of the matter is from the pen of Sir Claude Martin Wade, who was an actual eye-witness of the disinterment. The account was first printed by James Braid, in a tiny book,¹⁸ since become famous, entitled "Observations on trance or human hybernation," Edinburgh, 1850. The very title of Braid's sober and judicial treatise intimates that he sees nothing miraculous in this performance, but regards it rather as analogous to the hibernation common in many animals and as something that could be and was induced by natural, albeit most elaborate and painstaking, means. The case at any rate warns us against too ready incredulity concerning Hindu marvels that seem at first blush to pass the bounds of the possible.

To show the interest of studying Yoga in the light of the discoveries of modern psychology, I know of no better example than the story of Ruchi and Vipula. This is indubitably a case of hypnosis and effective suggestion to the hypnotized subject to refrain from yielding to a strong temptation to do a sinful act. If we knew nothing about the psychological facts involved, we Occidentals should certainly not recognize the true significance of the narrative, especially as its technical features are presented in a terminology which the facts alone can elucidate. Thus the gaining power over another's will by hypnotizing is called "entering the body of another" "as wind enters an empty space" — phrases of hopeless obscurity until we know in detail the nature of the facts intended. The story is given in the *Mahā-bhārata* (at

¹⁸ Braid was a surgeon of Manchester, England. The copy of his book that lay before me when I wrote this, was a gift "To the President of Harvard College with the author's compliments" in 1852. The little volume has since been transferred to the "Treasure Room." The account was reprinted by Garbe in *The Monist* for July, 1900, Chicago. See also Garbe in *Westermann's Monatshefte* for September, 1900; or W. Preyer's *Der Hypnotismus*, Berlin, 1882 (p. 46, translated from Braid); or Richard Schmidt, *Fakire*, p. 88.

xiii.40, 41), and it is to Hopkins that we owe the service of showing¹⁹ its meaning to Western scholars. The story itself is in brief as follows.

The sage Deva-çarman had a wife of great beauty named Ruchi. Even the gods were enamored of her, and in particular god Indra, whose illicit amours are notorious. Well aware of Indra's designs, the sage, before going away to perform a sacrifice, summons his pupil Vipula and bids him protect Ruchi and her virtue and especially as against the lustful Indra. Vipula, himself a man of the utmost integrity and virtue and self-control, agrees to do the bidding of his teacher, and asks him in what form Indra may be expected to appear. "In any one of many forms," answers Deva-çarman. "Indra may come wearing a diadem or a clout, as a Brahman or as an outcaste, as a parrot or as a lion, as an old man or as a young man, or indeed in the form of the wind-god. Therefore," he continues, "watch over her with diligence." And so he departs.

Vipula sagely reflects that, if the tempter can come in the form of the wind, a fence for the hermitage or a door for Ruchi's cottage would be of no avail. He resolves to protect her virtue "by the power of Yoga."²⁰ "I will enter her body by Yoga and in it I will abide, sunk in the deepest concentration (*samāhita*). If I keep myself free from the slightest trace of passion, I shall incur no guilt." Accordingly, he sits down by her, who is seated, and gazes steadily with his eyes into her eyes, and so that her gaze meets his, and fills her mind with longing for what is right, so that she is averse especially to any adul-

¹⁹ In his paper on Yoga-technique, already cited, *Journal of the Am. Oriental Society*, xxii.359. Compare his excellent comments upon the technical features of the story.

²⁰ In such a story as this, the phraseology of the original Sanskrit (at *Mahā-bhārata* xiii.40) is of moment. My phrases are accordingly intended to be correct reproductions. Note especially those enclosed within marks of quotation, and see stanzas 50-52 and 56-59 of the original, as numbered in the Bombay edition of 1888.

terous word or deed.²¹ “Vipula entered her body as the wind enters space, and remained there motionless, invisible. Then, making rigid the body of his teacher’s wife, he stayed there devoted to guarding her, and she was not aware of him.”

Indra, thinking “This is my chance,” comes now to the hermitage in the form of a man, young and very handsome, sees the body of Vipula seated and with staring eyes and motionless as a picture, and sees Ruchi also in all her loveliness. She, on seeing him and his superb beauty, *wanted* to rise and welcome him and ask him who he was. But under the influence of Vipula, she could not move a muscle. Indra makes known to her himself and his passion and the need of prompt assent. Vipula recognizes her danger from her looks, redoubles the force of his hypnotic suggestion, “and bound with Yoga-bonds all her faculties,” so that, although, in reply to Indra’s “Come, come,” she wanted to say “Yes,”—the words that actually escaped her were “Sir, what business hast thou to come here?” She was, the story adds, not without grave embarrassment at the incivility of her answer, “spoken under the control of another.” Indra now perceives “with his supernormal eye” that Vipula is “in Ruchi’s body like an image in a mirror,” and that his case is therefore hopeless, and trembles lest Vipula curse him. Vipula “quits the body of Ruchi” (that is, terminates the hypnosis), and, with unstinted rebukes to the crestfallen Indra, tells him to take himself off. — Deva-çarman returns and Vipula presents to him his wife unspoiled.

The facts relating to hypnotism were unknown to the Occident at the beginning of the last century. In 1841 James Braid independently discovered and observed and described many of the phenomena here concerned.

²¹ Such is, I take it, the significance of lakṣaṇaṁ lakṣaṇenāiva, vadaṇaṁ vadanena ca, at stanza 58.

Even the word *hypnotism*, as may be seen from Murray's Dictionary, is only about seventy-five years old, having been introduced with *hypnotize*, etc., into the English language by Braid himself in 1842. But in spite of the extreme modernity of the Occidental knowledge of the facts, and of the terminology in which they are recorded, there is already a large and rapidly growing literature upon the subject, and the elaborate treatise of John Milne Bramwell entitled "Hypnotism, its history, practice, and theory" (London, 1906) gives a bibliography of books and articles running into the hundreds. Nevertheless, the systematic treatises, those of Moll and Bramwell at least, do not even attempt to carry the history of hypnotism back beyond the times of Braid, Esdaile, Elliotson, and Mesmer — a statement which I make, not by way of carping, but rather by way of calling attention to an opportunity. Unless I err, the whole subject is commonly regarded in the Occident as very modern, a recent discovery, when in fact it has been well known and widely known in the Orient for over two thousand years.

The fruits of Yoga-practice are told, not only in systematic Sanskrit treatises on Yoga and in Buddhist books, but also incidentally, as I have said, in many epic or narrative texts. The exploitation of these texts by an Indianist who has already made a thorough study of modern psychology is sure to yield very striking results. In the second chapter of his work on hypnotism (page 109 of the new edition of A. E. Waite, London, 1899), Braid describes his technique for inducing hypnosis. What must our wonder be on finding that almost exactly fifteen centuries ago in the island of Ceylon there was written a book, Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhi-magga*, a large part of which is concerned with this very subject. With Buddhaghosa indeed it is self-hypnotization, but the technique of it is substantially the same as that of Braid

in all its essential features: the willingness on the part of the subject to submit himself, the comfortable position, the steady and slightly strained gaze, the fixed attention, the gentle monotonous sensory stimulations.—That important discoveries should be made by a people, and be made again centuries later and quite independently by another people,—this is one of the most astonishing facts of human history.

Envoy.—The foregoing paragraphs were written several years ago, just after I had spent months in trying to live up to my doubtless wildly misconceived notions of editorial fidelity. To forestall the perhaps yet harsher criticism of less friendly judges, I had tried to find every findable fault with Dr. Woods's Yoga-book before he sent it to the printer. Buddhaghosa wisely says that you must ever and always be on the lookout for the good points in others, not for their faults. Now that I come back to the book,—not as an editor, but rather as a human being,—I am simply amazed at the general impression which it makes upon me as the outcome of genuine enthusiasm and indomitable patience. All this and much more was needed to advance our scientific salients into the territory of the Hindu dialecticians. We may well imagine those jealous guardians of their sacred lore as saying to themselves of us, *ils ne passeront jamais!* But Dr. Woods's intellectual emplacements (metaphors, like the sleeves of blouses, must be in the fashion) were good, and his preliminary bombardments have been effective. The infantry assaults of a second edition, or of fresh troops of Indianists, are now in order.

What I greatly missed in his work—as I told him at the time—was a chapter, in addition to the discussions of his Introduction, which should somehow make clear to the Occidental mind what the relation is between such hairsplitting dialectic and the practical aim of this philo-

sophical system, to wit, Salvation or Release. True, my position is exactly that of the young man who was asked whether he could play the violin, and who answered that he didn't know, but that he could try. It is one thing to translate a text, or three texts, and it is quite another to interpret one of the great movements of the human mind to a generation of humanity transformed by the vicissitudes of two millenniums and the inexorable forces of a physical and intellectual environment as different as the East is from the West — and this last the reader may take either as the familiar biblical commonplace or as a literal simile. The wise men of the East, it is said, think that we know how to make a living and that they know how to live. And it was an Oriental who said, I am come that they might have life, and that they might have it more abundantly. I should like to have Professor Woods tell us wherein, according to the Yoga-view, the fulness of life consisteth.

It may be that my question is so wrongly put that I shall be adjudged an incompetent critic. But at any rate, Dr. Woods has made a large step in advance towards proving that I am wrong, or else towards answering me aright; and in either case I thank him heartily. Meantime he has published in the *Journal of our Oriental Society*, volume 34, *The Jewel's Lustre* or *Maṇi-prabhā*, and he has the *Yoga-vārttika* well in hand, if not practically ready for publication. Let us hope that he will not let the great power of such long-gathered momentum be dissipated by any avoidable delay.

The pervading gravity of tone of these Hindu philosophical discussions comports with their extreme difficulty, and is rarely relieved by a touch of humor, — unless it be when old Vāchaspati Miśra deigns to add to his Explanation of something less hard than the rest, the amusingly laconic observation, “Easy” (*su-gamam*: so at ii.43, 44). As who should laugh at us up his sleeve,

if he had any sleeve, for not knowing that much ourselves! And worse than the comments — *difficile per difficilium* — are the super-comments. Most of them, after they have been done into the clearest English, are still as tough as whitleather. But Professor Woods's book has often reminded me of the symphony-concerts in the old Drapers' Hall or Gewandhaus of my student days at Leipzig, and the staring legend on the cornice above the fiddles and trombones and viols,

RES SEVERA EST VERUM GAUDIUM.

Dr. Woods has not chosen one of the "soft snaps" of the Indian antiquity. Its further difficulties need not dismay him. And our dearly loved French brothers with whom he is now so zealously working, are showing us the supremely great lesson, that the first thing needed for substantial victory is the loftiest moral courage. Long, long ago Plutarch put that lesson in an unmatched phrase which has often sustained me,

ἀρχὴ γὰρ ὅντως τοῦ νικᾶν τὸ θαρρεῖν.

THE PAPACY AND THE MODERN STATE

ALFRED FAWKES

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More than a year ago, in a letter to the present writer, an eminent French *savant*, M. Alfred Loisy, contrasted the parts played by the Pope and the President of the United States respectively in the war. "Maintenant c'est Wilson qui devient pape, et qui fait la morale aux belligérants, en nous appuyant de son crédit politique, financier, militaire. Vive le pape Wilson!" The contrast was just. "Faire la morale aux belligérants" — this is what we expect a Pope to do. We have been disappointed; it is exactly what he has not done. On the other hand, the President is the one politician on either side who has risen to the level of a statesman, and has gained, not lost, in reputation during the last four years. It must be remembered that he came late into the firing line, and has therefore been less exposed than his European colleagues to the test of time under which so many of them have broken down. But more than any one man now in public life, he stands for the combination of Reason and Energy.

"Vis consili expers mole ruit sua;
Vim temperatam di quoque provehant
In majus." ¹

"Happily," says an English journalist, referring to certain political issues which need not be dwelt on here, "happily, there is America. We might have been the captain of the Western Alliance. She is." ² On the field

¹ Horace. Odes iii, 4.

² Nation. March 2, 1918.

of ethics, it is true. "The moral leadership in the war is not the least of the debts which we owe to the intervention of the United States."³

Yet though the other disciple has "outrun" Peter — the modern state having taken over more than one function formerly discharged by the Papacy — the Note addressed by Benedict XV (August, 1917) to the Heads of the Belligerent Peoples is a notable document. Its effect on public opinion was small. But this public opinion was to a great extent manufactured; as sixteenth-century rulers tuned the pulpits, so twentieth-century party wire-pullers tune the press. The London "Press-Industry," which has become one of the worst features of English political life, started a campaign of denigration. The conductor waved his *bâton*, the instruments blared and brayed in unison; as far as its influence extends, and it extends widely, not a discordant note was heard. That this was so was not due either to hatred of Popery or to love of Protestantism. The "Press-Industry" is above either weakness, and can adapt itself on occasion to either creed. There are springs of action less respectable than bigotry. To large classes of the community the war is a very profitable investment; and, without crediting them with direct and conscious commercial motives, men do not readily destroy that by which they live. It is impossible to overlook the great and increasing mass of vested interests that has been created. Officials are multiplied, salaries liberal, profits swollen, prices high. "Five pounds a week am I making syne the war," said a Scotch "body"; "and there's that auld deevil the Pope wanting peace."

Whatever else he may be or not be, the Pope is the first ecclesiastic in Christendom; and if in human things the actual falls short of the ideal, we need not

³ Daily News, April 8, 1918.

assume that the official bias from which the Head of so great a politico-ecclesiastical institution as the Roman Catholic Church cannot, and probably would not if he could, wholly free himself, is such as to make his appeal for peace either perfunctory or insincere. It is permissible to think that it was neither. The spirit in which the Pope's Easter Message (1918) to "the noble British nation" is conceived is admirable; and personally, though his type is that of the official and his genius administrative rather than inspired or creative, Benedict XV is an able, an excellent, and a moderate man. Shrewd, unemotional, silent, he is in every respect unlike his immediate predecessor; he resembles rather Leo XIII, though he has neither that Pope's arbitrary temper nor his large views. A statesman he is not; and he has been described as *un petit, un très petit politicien*. In the notorious von Gerlach case, he was the dupe of a vulgar Mephistopheles—which he must have resented bitterly. It is his misfortune that the situation in which he finds himself calls for just those qualities—insight, inspiration, leadership—that he does not possess. In normal times he would have made an excellent Pope; but the times are not normal. *Consensu omnium imperii capax, nisi imperasset* will perhaps be the verdict of history. He is characterized by a certain flatness; he is neither inspired nor inspiring, and in fact he does not inspire. What he sees he sees clearly; his understanding is positive; he is under no illusions as to what a modern Pope can and cannot do. This is probably why he is slow to urge the religious motive on evil-doers; were he to do so, he would be, he knows, "speaking into the air." The war has been an object-lesson in the inefficacy of this motive. This has been so even in the narrower sense of the word "religion." The sacrileges perpetrated by Catholic Austrians and Bavarians in Catholic churches and on Catholic priests and

religious persons of both sexes have been as atrocious as those committed by Protestant Prussians and unbaptized Turks. "The children of Israel have forsaken thy covenant, thrown down thine altars, and slain thy priests with the sword."

The Pope, however, is one thing; the Papacy another. The excuses that may be urged for Giacomo della Chiesa aggravate the case against the Roman See. To those who regard the Papacy as the corner-stone of religion, its "neutrality" in this great conflict between good and evil must, if they allow themselves to think, be an embarrassment. For "he that is not with me is against me." It was for "neutrality" that Meroz was cursed. Never was Authority and all that Authority implies — exhortation, denunciation, correction — more called for.

"Prophet of God, arise and take
With thee the words of wrath divine,
The scourge of heaven, to shake
O'er yon apostate shrine."

The motives alleged for non-intervention are those of human prudence. In the case of the Vice-Gerent of Deity they are not even colorable; nor, to do them justice, does the special pleading of Catholic apologists give the impression of any great enthusiasm or conviction on their part. Not so did the great Popes of the Middle Ages, the Gregories, the Innocents, conceive their office. They would have made short work with the man whose lawless ambition has let loose these horrors upon humanity — "to deliver such an one unto Satan for the destruction of the flesh." They believed in themselves; and this was why the world believed in them. The world will sit loose to an authority which is not sure of itself; it has no use for a *Roi fainéant* — a Teacher who cannot, or will not, or at least does not teach. That the patience, if not the faith, of Catholics has been tried

is beyond dispute. M. Denys Cochin's letter to the *Gaulois* (April 2) on the silence of the Vatican in the matter of the French hostages taken by the Germans is an example. "Hold not thy tongue, O God, keep not still silence; refrain not thyself, O God." Nor is dissatisfaction confined to Catholics. Those of us even who regard the Papacy rather from the standpoint of history than from that of theology are chilled. For the moral forces at the disposition of mankind are neither so many nor so strong that we can afford to see the disappearance of what was once one of their number with indifference,

"Men are we, and must grieve when even the Shade
Of that which once was great is passed away."

The ground of complaint is not that the Pope is personally indifferent either to the horrors of war or to the interests of peace; Benedict XV is neither; but that he has kept silence, even from good words, when, as Pope, speech was incumbent upon him; and that to all appearance he is blind to the moral issues involved in and raised by the war. He would probably answer the first objection by urging that nothing he could say would have the smallest effect; which is true, but which is an admission fatal to the very idea of the Papacy; and the second by reminding us that his conception of morality and of the good of mankind is not ours. This is so; and it is here that the crux of the situation lies.

The Pope, though the Head of the clerical profession — "in him we see the pretensions, the merits, the demerits of the clerical office in its most complete, perhaps in its most exaggerated, form"⁴ — is a Priest, not a Prophet. This is the secret both of his success in the past and of his failure in the present. There was a time when an Absolute Ruler — Priest or King — was a condition

⁴ Stanley, *Christian Institutions*, p. 220.

of human progress. It passed. The Reign of Law followed. That of Spirit is yet to come. The Papacy is still in the first stage, and by a law of its being cannot get beyond it; the world is passing out of the second into the third. The Papacy, therefore, survives like a fossil remnant of earlier *strata* in a new geological formation; it shows us what the past of the race has been. And if, when we consider its long history, it seems to us that from the first its material side has been more prominent than its moral, we may remember the saying of the historian, that "the natural man is a born Catholic."⁵ Esau is supplanted, not only because Jacob is a supplanter, but because he, Esau, lays himself open to being supplanted, and so becomes the trickster's easy prey. And here the Roman Church does but exhibit, writ large, features which she has in common with the other Churches. The interests of the institution which they represent bulk large before Churchmen. A regard, perhaps an excessive regard, for these interests "is the badge of all our tribe."

The policy of individual Popes varies. That of Gregory XVI was Austrian; that of Pius IX Legitimist; that of Leo XIII French; that of Pius X German. But the Pope is the titular Head of a great international polity which was before him and will be after him; which has its historical genius, temper, tendencies, and laws. Under the surface-waters this deeper stream runs in its own direction and with its own velocity. Chronic and acute as has been the strife between them—for the contention which should be the greater is eternal—the connection between the Holy Roman Church and the Holy Roman Empire is intimate. A common interest unites them. Both stand for Authority, and for the Force (in the last resort a material Force) which lies behind it; and Force, as Renan reminds us, "is not

⁵ Rudolf Sohm. *Outline of Church History*, p. 35.

an amiable thing." Such as it is, however, it is the link between these two great institutions. It is an effectual one. They can neither part, nor live at peace together; they are an inseparable, if an ill-mated pair.

In its mediæval shape the Holy Roman Empire disappeared in the Napoleonic wars. But its spirit survives in the Central Powers. Austria is the nearest approach to a Catholic state now left in Europe; only its preponderance in the Near East stands between Rome and the *terra incognita* of Slav religion: while the third part of the population of the German Empire is Catholic; and the grouping of parties is such as to give the Catholic Centre a disproportionate influence in German politics; its vote turns the scale. These are assets which the Papacy will not easily relinquish; and this is why an anti-German Papacy is unthinkable. This has been the case increasingly since the Congress of Vienna. The Popes of the Holy Alliance were the instruments of the Hapsburgs. For a moment Pius IX broke loose: but in 1848 he learned his lesson, and never forgot it; the Vatican came to heel. The Pontificate of his successor was of the nature of an interlude. Leo XIII, who was in the line of the greater Popes, made France the keystone of his policy in the hope of making the Republic what the Monarchy had been, the eldest daughter of the Church. But this hope was doomed to disappointment; France, which bore with her the fortunes of civilization, was launched on larger seas. He did not, however, abandon it: "Nothing," he emphatically assured the French ambassador⁶ when he received him for the last time before his death, "nothing should make him break with France." The consideration of the "ifs" of history is as attractive as it is unprofitable: had the policy of Leo been continued by his successor, what might not the result have been? On his death, however

⁶ The late M. Nisard.

(1903), the Vatican reverted to its traditional policy. Pius X owed his election to the Austrian veto; the Central Powers were determined to exclude the one man of ability in the Sacred College, the pro-French Cardinal Rampolla; and when the present Pontiff succeeded (1914), the abolition of the Concordat had made relations with France embarrassed, and the conservative forces in Italian politics, of which the Pope is the natural ally, were German at heart. It was not surprising that Benedict XV should have followed the line of least resistance. The incompetence of his predecessor had left the Papacy in a state of dilapidation; he had to rebuild. Had he been a master-builder—which he was not—the war might well have made his difficulties insuperable; for the Papacy is a political rather than a religious institution. It would be too much, no doubt, to say that it is indifferent to religion; it is not too much to say that it is political first and religious afterwards, that policy counts for more than religion in its designs. A genius might have dared and won, both greatly; but Benedict XV was not a genius; he “fought after the manner of men.” For Rome, England is the great Protestant Power, France the great anti-clerical Power, Russia the great anti-Latin Power; Italy is anti-Papal; America is a *sentina gentium* from which, let European politics shape themselves as they will, dollars can always be drawn. Why should it love any of us? It is foolish to expect it; its aims and methods are other than ours. Like goes to like, not to unlike; the Papacy does and we do not “believe in gods in whose name men kill.” Brieux’s famous phrase expresses the situation with exactness. The German ideal is akin to the Papal, and can be dovetailed into it with little difficulty. The English, the Italian, the French, the American, cannot. “Between us and you there is a great gulf fixed.”

This gulf is none the less real because it is, in a sense, intangible. For, as M. Emile Faguet has admirably expressed it:

“A religion is not only a collection of dogmas; it is a body of men animated by similar tendencies of conscience, will, and temper. For centuries the Catholic Church has not only been authoritative herself; she has also upheld authority as such, and other than her own. All power is of God; her own first and foremost; but also all those powers, whatever their origin, whose prescription guarantees their establishment — an establishment human indeed but approved by God. So that if it is asked, ‘What sort of people are, or become, or are satisfied to remain, Catholics; or, being — so to speak — semi-Catholics, regard Catholicism with favour?’ the answer is, ‘All, or almost all those, whose disposition is authoritative; who are temperamentally conservative, and opposed to innovation.’ The result is that the Church is the rallying point of persons whose temperament is that of authority. The lover of novelty — the Liberal, the emancipator, above all the revolutionary — gravitate naturally towards liberal Protestantism or Free Thought, or, more frequently still, become unbelieving Catholics, who retain nothing of Catholicism but the name.

“To what then did Lamennais invite the Church? To the abandonment of her historical tradition, and to the sacrifice of the most numerous, the most persistent, the most devoted, and the most energetic of her following. No Church, no party, will for a moment entertain such an idea. A Church is tied by its past and to its adherents, because its past and its adherents make it what it is. I will not say that a Church would rather renounce its beliefs than its general spirit. But it is certain that, provided the discussion is discreet and indirect, it will more readily admit discussion of its particular tenets than of its general spirit. In the one case it can shut its eyes; in the other it is compelled to open them. The Church, mainly composed, as she is, of men of arbitrary and authoritative temper, may come to find herself everywhere a minority; but she will none the less everywhere uphold the powers that be, and desire her adherents to respect them, regardless of whether their form be monarchical or republican. For there is a consideration which weighs more than this with her; that is, the stability of the civil power, corresponding in general to the stability of the spiritual power; a stability good in itself, and in harmony with the desires,

the genius, and the character of the faithful who constitute the reserve force of the Church.”⁷

It is probable that in the first instance Benedict XV believed in a speedy and decisive German victory. He was not alone in this belief; in the Italian army, among Italian conservatives, and in cosmopolitan Italian society, it was widely held. Now he is not sure of it. He would like to be. *Fiat justitia ruat coelum* is an idea beyond his horizon; and powerful influences of more than one order are at work to persuade him that his original anticipation will be realized. But he is too astute to be convinced that it is so. It is probable that he now thinks that the issue of the war will be inconclusive, neither side being able to inflict a definite defeat on its opponent, and that his policy is to keep a foot in each camp. It would perhaps be truer to say that he keeps a foot and a half in that of the Germans; the action of the Canadian hierarchy in the Bourassa controversy shows the direction in which the wind of Roman officialism blows. An enthusiast might risk all for right; a statesman might foresee the triumph of the larger idea and of liberty; but Popes are not enthusiasts, and priests neither love liberty nor move easily among ideas. It is to the credit of Benedict XV that he was a *persona ingrata* at the court of his predecessor. It is impossible to conceive him stooping to that level; he was of another world. But those who have been brought into contact with him describe him as a man rather of concrete than of abstract mind. He sees a number of particular facts more readily than a general principle, and approaches a subject rather from the particular than from the universal side. He avoids the *question de droit*; the positive, the *question de fait* — this is his element. He will not denounce the crimes of the pious Emperors; it would

⁷ Emile Faguet. *Politiques et moralistes du XIX^{me} Siècle*. Vol. II, p. 123.

be useless; and he has an eye to the future; the Hun is a bad enemy, and may still be a useful friend. It is not heroic, but a casuist could probably make a case for it; and the official mind is much of a muchness in all the Churches, which are seen at their worst in dealing with ideas, or with movements into which ideas enter — the clergy, the Royalist historian of the Civil Wars reminds us, taking “the worst measure of affairs and measures of all men that can read and write.” Never has that wise saying been more strikingly verified than in our own time. “L’attitude du Vatican durant la présente guerre est principalement caractérisée par une foncière inintelligence de cette crise de l’humanité,” says the distinguished French writer who has been already quoted. “Pour Benoit XV, c’est une guerre comme une autre, qu’il s’agirait de terminer par un compromis — en attendant de nouveaux conflits — et la démocratie ce pape comprend rien. Ses sympathies sont tous naturellement aux vieilles monarchies, qu’il croit encore beaucoup plus fortes qu’elles ne sont en réalité. Je pense qu’en reprenant la série des actes de Benoit XV il serait assez facile d’en montrer l’insignifiance réelle et l’esprit suranné.”⁸

In a democratic country, such as France or America, Catholics are naturally unwilling to be placed in an attitude of opposition to the form of government which commends itself to the majority of the citizens. Leo XIII rallied French Catholics to the support of the Republic; “There,” he said, pointing to the crucifix, “is the one corpse to which the church is tied.” It was the greatest act of a great pontificate. There is no reason why a Catholic should not be a democrat — using the word in the European sense. The Church indeed is a monarchy, and tends more and more to become an absolute monarchy; but it does not follow

⁸ M. Alfred Loisy, Professeur au Collège de France.

that the state should be so; here it may go its own way. It was a Catholic poet who wrote the famous lines,

“For forms of government let fools contest.
Whate’er is best administered is best”;

and though those which immediately follow them —

“For modes of faith let graceless zealots fight;
His can’t be wrong whose life is in the right”⁹ —

embody a whole series of condemned propositions, the most rigorous censor could not refuse the *Imprimatur* to the former couplet. For Catholicism has no quarrel with Democracy as such — that is, with government by the community as a whole, as distinct from government either by a single ruler or by a privileged class. The political doctrine of St. Thomas is that of an English Whig of 1688. “As it is lawful to resist robbers, so it is lawful to resist evil rulers”; though, “if the tyranny be not excessive, it is more profitable to endure it for a time than by active resistance to incur graver dangers than those which arise from the tyranny in question.”¹⁰ In the seventeenth century another line of thought appears. Some Catholic writers, with the Jesuits Suarez and Mariana, developed the theology of tyrannicide. Others argued either (after Hobbes) that the *de facto* existence of a government carried its legitimation with it, or (with the patriarchists) that monarchy had its origin in natural law, and that, once made, the delegation of sovereignty was irrecoverable; in which case the actual community had no more voice in the matter than children in the selection of their parents. Such authors,

⁹ Pope. Essay on Man. Epistle iii.

¹⁰ “Sicut licet resistere latronibus, ita licet resistere malis principibus.” (Summa Theologiae, 2.2. q. 69 & 4.)

“Si non fuerit excessus tyrannidis, utilius est remissam tyrannidem tolerari ad tempus, quam contra tyrannum agendo multis implicari periculis quae sunt graviora ipso tyrannide.” (De Regimine Princ: VI, 1.)

however, were rather jurists than theologians, and their motives were frankly opportunist. At one time, for example, it was desired to justify the assassination of Protestant rulers; at another to revive the doctrine of the Deposing Power of the Popes; at a third to terrorize pietists into the support of the Bourbon and Hapsburg monarchies. As Pascal put it to the Jesuits, "*Toutes vos démarches sont politiques.*"¹¹ But it is a true maxim of the canonists that such opinions are born — and die.¹² In practice common sense asserted itself. "Though they should deny it a hundred times, kings reign only by the suffrages of the people," writes a fourteenth-century French lawyer;¹³ and our own John Selden — "A king is a thing men have made for their own selves, for quietness' sake."¹⁴ The *jus divinum* of the Stuarts was a figment of the Reformation: "The Reformers did much advance the King's Supremacy, for they only cared to exclude the Pope." In our own time the words of Leo XIII are explicit: "No form of civil government is to be blamed in itself, not even that which gives the people a share, greater or less as the case may be, in the exercise of sovereignty; a function which at certain times and under certain conditions may be not only profitable to the citizens but even incumbent upon them."¹⁵ The limitation "in itself" (per se) should, however, be noted. The Papacy has suffered too much from kings to be wedded to monarchy; but it is irreconcilably hostile to certain features, not indeed of Democracy as such, but of Democracy of the lay type, the only type now possible — to that emanci-

¹¹ XVII^{me} Lettre Provinciale.

¹² *Communes opiniones nascuntur, et moriuntur.*

¹³ Michel de Dormans, 1383.

¹⁴ Table-Talk LXX, LXXI.

¹⁵ "Nulla per se reprehenditur ex variis rei publicæ formis . . . immo neque illud per se reprehenditur participem plus minusve esse populum rei publicæ certis: quod ipsum certis in temporibus certisque legibus potest non solum ad utilitatem, sed etiam ad officium pertinere civium." (Encyclical Immortale Dei. 1885.)

pation of lay from clerical life and mind known loosely but with sufficient accuracy for practical purposes as Liberalism. In this connection the Bull of Pius IX, *Quanta Cura* (1864) with the annexed *Syllabus*, and the Decree *Lamentabili sane* with the Encyclical *Pascendi Dominici Gregis* of Pius X (1907), deserve careful study.¹⁶ The proposition that "the Roman Pontiff can and should reconcile himself, and come to terms, with Progress, with Liberalism, and with Modern Civilization," was condemned by the former Pope; while the latter denounces the opinions that "in temporal matters the Church should be subject to the State," and that "the government of the Church, in particular in matters of doctrine and discipline, should be brought into harmony with the modern conscience, *quae tota ad democratiam vergit* — the whole tendency of which is in the direction of Democracy."

It is to Liberalism, however, rather than to Democracy that the Church is opposed. The alliance between Berlin and Rome is *ad hoc*, and would not stand the strain — to which it is improbable that it will be exposed — of a German victory. The Kulturkampf followed close upon Sedan. Perhaps the social order from which the Papacy has most to hope — it appears to be that which it desires to see established in Ireland — is a democracy of peasants segregated from European civilization and ruled by priests. Paraguay under the Jesuits, Ecuador under Garcia Moreno, or the Swiss Cantons of the Sonderbund are examples. The kings of the earth may, under certain circumstances, be the lesser of two evils; but the ideal of the priestly historian is a Theocracy; "The Lord your God was your King."¹⁷ For — here is the thing itself — this Divine King rules

¹⁶ These documents will be found in Denzinger's *Enchiridion*, Edition XI. Herder, 1911.

¹⁷ 1 Samuel 12 12.

through the hierarchy. "Each of the two swords, the spiritual and the material, is at the disposition of the Church; but the latter is employed for, the former by, her. The one is wielded by the hand of the priest, the other by that of kings and soldiers, but at the priest's will and bidding. For it must be that the one sword be subject to the other, and the temporal authority obey the spiritual rule."¹⁸ Thus Boniface VIII.

But the extravagance of the claim was its refutation; the weapon broke in his hands.

"Veggio in Anagni entrar lo fior d'aliso
E nel vicario suo Christo esser catto."¹⁹

The end of an age was in sight. For no modern State is moving, or can by any possibility move, on these lines. "Believe in the Pope?" said Dr. Arnold with his usual directness; "I would as soon believe in Jupiter!" Both belong to a world that has passed away. Such cults linger in an enfeebled form in back-waters, among those who for one reason or another lie outside the main current of life. The worship of the old gods survived among the country folks — (*pagus, paganus, paganism*); the peasant element is the strength of Catholicism to-day. On these levels both are genuine. Elsewhere they ring hollow. There was an element of make-belief in the neo-paganism of the Emperor Julian; there is a strain of unreality in the neo-Catholic apologetic of to-day. De Maistre, Brownson, Newman — it is brilliant fencing, but it is the fencing of the *salle d'escrime*, not of the battlefield; there is an absence of the real thing. The policy of the modern Papacy is one of shifts and

¹⁸ "Uterque est in potestate Ecclesiæ, spiritualis scilicet gladius et materialis; sed is quidem pro Ecclesia, ille vero ab Ecclesia, exercendus: ille sacerdotis, is manu regum et militum, sed ad nutum et patientiam sacerdotis. Oportet autem gladium esse sub gladio, et temporalem auctoritatem spirituali subjici potestati." (Bull *Unam Sanctam*, 1302.)

¹⁹ *Purgatorio* XX, 89.

expedients. Like Autolycus, it is "a snapper-up of unconsidered trifles." Bankruptcy is inevitable; but it can still fish in troubled waters, make small temporary profits, overreach an unwary opponent, put off the evil day. More than this it cannot do. It is *frappé de caducité*.²⁰ It is only on the dial of Ahaz that the shadow went back.

It is difficult to argue from the teaching of a Church to the practice of its members. Religion is one of many motives which influence conduct, and it is not always the strongest motive; men are at once better and worse than their creeds. But Catholicism has in many respects a stronger hold on its adherents than Protestantism; its appeal to the senses and the imagination is more persistent, its machinery is more effective and better worked. The dream-democracy of the priests comes through the gate of ivory; though we would have them otherwise, "things are what they are." But the pressure which can be brought to bear upon individuals is great, and it is impossible to foresee when and where it will be overwhelming. During the Italian *Risorgimento* the Roman question sent English and Irish Catholics into the camp of Continental Absolutism; peasants from Connaught, who would have been Fenians in Ireland, enlisted among the Papal Zouaves. A generation later, when Gladstonian Home Rule was before the country, the Education controversy split the Irish vote in England; the Marriage question may have the same result in our own time. This makes the Catholic vote an incalculable quantity. It is peculiarly liable to be swayed by pietistic sentiment; it is irrational — open to the influence of clerical wire-pullers, of women, of the confessional. A hint, a whisper — and the trick is done. The picture given by the author of *Jean Barois*²¹ is

²⁰ A. Loisy. *Quelques Lettres*, p. 73.

²¹ M. Roger Martin Du Gard. Paris, 1913.

lifelike; it needs a strong swimmer to make head against the tide. There are, no doubt, Catholics who can do so, but they are exceptional. Nor is indifference a guarantee of immunity. The most indifferent have their religious moments — "Just when we are safest, there's a sunset-touch";²² and those who identify piety with superstition are often superstition's easiest prey.

It is these petty, chance, and diminishing gains that confirm the Papacy in its policy of self-seeking; it "minds earthly things"; and self-seeking in religion spells disaster. Its best friends are those who, even at the cost of a rude awakening, would shake it out of its evil dream. The dramatic collapse of Russian Tsardom with its Empire and Church is, it may seem, a gain to the Vatican. Such gains have been before now fallacious. "Are you quite sure he is dead?" is the question put by an English cartoonist into the mouth of the Emperor of Austria, when his Over-lord bade him walk over the bearskin.²³ There may yet be life in the Bear. And the Wise King would counsel the Pope against premature confidence:

"Rejoice not when thine enemy falleth
And let not thine heart be glad when he is overthrown,
Lest the Lord see it, and it displease him,
And he turn away his wrath from him." ²⁴

An uncertain gain among a semi-civilized Eastern peasantry is dearly bought at the price of the alienation of the conscience and mind of Europe. "Ce que je constate est que dans le monde entier la France c'est le catholicisme," said M. Brunetière. Leo XIII bid for this great prize; Pius X threw it away; Benedict XV might have regained it, but has failed to do so. This is the tragedy,

²² Browning. Bishop Blougram's Apology.

²³ Punch. March 27, 1918.

²⁴ Proverbs 24, 17, 18.

it may well be the final tragedy, of his well-intentioned but ill-starred reign.

"Delicta majorum immeritus lues,
Romane, donec templa refeceris." ²⁵

The Church, if she would repair her fallen fortunes, must worship at her first shrines.

The author of *France*, Mr. Bodley, whose knowledge of that country is perhaps unique and who has always displayed a very friendly feeling for the Roman Catholic Church, sums up the situation:

"The enemies of the Church in France, always indefatigable, had an ally in the Vatican. From the moment when the Austrian Cardinal at the Conclave of 1903 vetoed the election to the papacy of Rampolla, who represented a policy conciliatory to France, the Vatican has been considered, rightly or wrongly, an Austro-German agency. But for Rampolla's defeat, it is probable that that admirable instrument, the Concordat, would not have been abrogated, the rupture of which has removed the last trace of Gallicanism from the French Episcopate. The policy of the new Pope, elected in the first weeks of the war, has, justly or unjustly, persuaded impartial spectators, who have no love for anti-clericalism, that the Vatican desires and works for the victory of Germany and Austria, and the abasement of France, of Italy, and of England. The position of the French bishops is one of painful difficulty. Of patriotism beyond reproach, they are compelled by their dependence on the Holy See to express their loyalty to it, a dilemma of which the anti-clericals are not slow to take advantage. The sacrifice of life and limb and health made by thousands of the younger clergy have had their effect counteracted by the allegation that the clergy is a body primarily owing allegiance to a power which in the European conflict is hostile to France." ²⁶

It is probable that the destiny of the Papacy will work itself out rather by detrition than by catastrophe;

²⁵ Horace. Odes iii, vi.

²⁶ The quotation is made, by the author's kind permission, from a forthcoming work, *The Romance of the Battle Line in France*, by Mr. J. E. C. Bodley, Corresponding Member of the Institute of France.

the end is not, and will not be, yet. No human institution lives so successfully on a false reputation; so effectively disguises its losses and placards its gains. But the balance sheet is decisive. The future of Latin religion is a problem; that of Latin Catholicism, in its historical shape, is not. The divergence of principle between the Papacy and the modern State places the future of the Papacy beyond question: it "must decrease."

PHILLIPS BROOKS¹

LEIGHTON PARKS

NEW YORK

St. John tells us that when Jesus was parting with his friends he comforted them with the assurance that, though for a little while they should not see him, the time would come when they should have a deeper understanding of his life.

It is twenty-five years since Phillips Brooks died, and as we think of what he was to those who knew him, how great our loss has been, let us hope that some such experience as John prophesied has been ours in our relation to our great friend. We can no longer see him as in the days when his great physical presence loomed above us, and his cordial welcome greeted us, and his wisdom filled us with a sense of the richness of life, or even as when in this pulpit he made our insignificance seem accidental and our possibilities the reality which God would glorify. But because he too has gone to the Father we may be able to have a clearer understanding of the spiritual significance of his life, as we think not alone of what he was to us but still more of what he "was worth to God."

In *The Life of Stopford Brooke*, a brilliant preacher contemporary with Brooks, in many ways most unlike him but physically his peer, there is a description of his presence so perfectly applicable to Brooks that I venture to quote it:

"His message never seemed a burden to him; it came forth unlaboured, a spontaneous utterance sustained with joy, with passion,

¹ An address delivered in Trinity Church, Boston, on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the death of Phillips Brooks, January 23, 1918.

and with an affluence of fine and fitting words. His form and figure in the pulpit were a vision of the higher opportunities of man. To look at him was to be lifted up, kindled, reassured. He had the air of one born in a better world than this, and a cloud of glory from his birthplace seemed to follow him. Virtue went out from his presence, and though some were left cold and untouched, there were always many to whom the sight of his face, as he delivered his message, or administered the Holy Communion, was as the breath of a new life. His published sermons stand high in the literature of the pulpit, but no eloquence of the written word can convey the power of enforcement that lay in his personality. The influence struck deep while he was in the act of speaking, and when the sermon was over, the mind would linger on the image of the man, and unconsciously construct a greater sermon for itself.”²

This is a description of power and beauty. The last line in particular reminds us, I think, of a test of genius. When we read the clever writers or listen to the words of men of more than ordinary gifts, how often is the effect depressing! We feel the distance that divides our ordinary minds from theirs. We feel the hopelessness of ever doing as well as they have done. That is a common experience which every reader knows. It is an experience that the clergy perhaps alone can appreciate in listening to a man whom they recognize as their superior. I remember well at the beginning of my ministry hearing two distinguished preachers, one a gifted minister of the Congregational Church in America, Dr. Richard S. Storrs, and another a brilliant ecclesiastic of the Anglican communion, Canon Liddon. I remember coming away from the hearing of both these men discouraged, feeling how impossible it would be ever to do the brilliant work they were doing. But I never listened to Brooks, and I doubt if any minister ever listened to him, without experiencing that exhilaration which “unconsciously constructs a greater sermon for itself.” It was like reading Shakespeare. We felt

² Life and Letters of Stopford Brooke, by Lawrence Pearsall Jacks, Vol. II, p. 357.

for a moment that it was a mere accident that prevented us from saying what he was saying, from seeing what he saw; the reason being that the rod of genius causes the waters to gush forth from the rock, which without that touch could never have found issue; and as the stream comes forth, it mingles with the river of life and is thereby glorified.

As we consider the divine gift of the sublime physical presence of the man, we see that his life was sacramental, the physical was but the outward and visible sign of abounding spiritual vitality. In the beautiful poem embodied in the Book of Genesis, "Joseph," the poet says, "is a fruitful vine. His branches run over the wall." How true this was of the man of whom we are thinking today! Indeed, if we are limited, as we now are, to one word by which we may express the characteristic of Phillips Brooks, shall we not say it is the luxuriance of his nature, the abounding vitality of the man, the inexhaustible faith, the ever-widening love, and the eternal hope?

The first and most important manifestation of his abounding vitality was a luxuriant faith. His early religious life was nourished in the evangelical atmosphere, and personal faith in Jesus Christ was the root of his wonderful ministry. It began, no doubt, with the child's love and reverence for the Saviour who lived long ago; it passed into the youth's discipleship for a Master whom he revered and obeyed; but it grew into a mystic communion unmarred by fancies or self-consciousness. To him Jesus was an ever-present friend. The love that is usually divided between wife and children he gave to his Lord, who was "closer to him than breathing, nearer than hands and feet." There was the hiding of his power; and there, I suspect, lay the secret of that strange aloofness which no one penetrated. It admits of no analysis. It will be judged abnormal by the

positivist, and natural by those who have experienced even a moment of the communion of God through Christ.

But here was the wonder: This mysticism neither became morbid nor reacted into rationalism. This was, no doubt, due first to the practical demands of his ministry, and secondly to the fact that his intellectual nature was vigorous and ever growing. As a rule, two such elements are apt to be in conflict; and as a result the spiritual nature is troubled and one becomes the master and determines the direction of life. This was the experience of Newman, whose rationalism turned to scepticism and then scepticism in panic sought sanctuary at the altar. Or, as in the case of Froude and others of the mid-Victorian age, the rational overcame the mystic and scepticism became the habit of life. But with Brooks the mystic and the rational seemed to develop without conflict. What he said of Tennyson's poetry describes himself: "Thought is saturated in emotion;" and so his religious life was as serene and mellow as a day in June.

If those who knew him best found that there were chambers in his soul to which no one was admitted, they found also that his intellectual hospitality was unbounded. "A Broad Churchman," he once said, "is not one who holds certain opinions, but one who holds his opinions on a rational basis;" and with all such he delighted to commune. He certainly could give an answer if asked the reason of his faith. That reason led him far away from the dogmatic teaching of his youth. The evangelical theology in which he was trained was based on the Atonement, and the Atonement was popularly identified with the theory of the substitution of a sinless Victim for a guilty sinner and by that substitution God's wrath was turned away. It was almost certain that a youth in whose veins ran the blood of

Unitarians, who had been bred at Harvard when it was a denominational college, who read the sermons of Channing and had hosts of Unitarian friends, could not long rest satisfied with such a dogma, and he did not. But the wonder was that, having broken with that theology, he did not react and abandon the ministry of a Church whose Liturgy justifies men in holding such a theory of Divine righteousness. His evangelical brethren thought he must be a Unitarian, and some of his Unitarian friends could not see how he could be anything else.

It was because of his luxuriant faith. His branches ran over the wall, and their leaves were nourished by rain and sunshine that the plants of lesser growth could not obtain. He never pretended that he was in sympathy with many of the opinions embodied in the Liturgy and the Creeds, but he did believe that his faith could be expressed in those archaic forms. He believed that those forms had been created to *preserve* the faith and that they had done so, but he never thought of them as *containing* a growing faith. The branches of the growing Church's life ought to run over the wall.

The mistake his puzzled critics made was in supposing that when he no longer assented to an opinion long identified with an Article of Faith, his faith had grown less, whereas it had expanded. The problem of the Creeds arises not from paucity of faith—very little is required for conformity—the problem arises when faith has grown great. "Keep the branches within the wall," cries the timorous traditionalist. "Let the branches hang over the wall till they tear up the roots," cries the radical. But this man of great faith had the roots of his life embedded in the past and drew nourishment from soil which the fastidious would not touch, while his branches were growing into and toward the light.

Let me try to make this clearer by an illustration drawn from an unpublished Good Friday address. Every student of theology knows what a part the word "satisfaction" played in the Calvinistic system, and how the conscience of the New England Churches at length rose up against all that it implied. No one was more in sympathy with the protest than Brooks. No one shrank more from all the horrid travesty of Calvary than he; yet, though the Incarnation had come to be the centre of his thinking, he never lost the message of the Atonement. On one occasion he spoke of Jesus Christ's death as a satisfaction to his Father — and instantly illumined the whole dreadful controversy by asking, "How can a son's death be a satisfaction to his father?" Then, no doubt with the memory of his brother's death in the Civil War in mind, he poured out his heart in praise of the son who gave his life for a great cause and the father's supreme satisfaction in knowing his son had died to free his brother-man. For God to have His will perfectly done on earth by a Son that shrank from no pain, not even death, trusting and loving his Father in his agony, surely with that, not the wrath but the love of God was satisfied. It was his luxuriant sympathy that enabled him to get at the heart of the truth and so find a ground on which good men might meet.

That sort of thing did not please the literalist, and sometimes he would speak of it with a pitying smile as "poetry," as if poetry were a common thing which any man might have who wished it, whereas logic was a rare gift which he and a few others possessed! And, on the other hand, there were those who took a less charitable view of a man who, they said, each week recited words which he did not believe, and either asserted plainly that he was dishonest or else saved his veracity at the expense of his intelligence. It seems

incredible to those who knew Brooks, knew his scrupulous accuracy, his uncompromising insistence that, a lie being a vile thing, a man should not touch it even to save his own life or his friend's, that any one could believe it possible that he could be capable of disingenuousness! Indeed, no one who knew him did suppose it. But it hurt him cruelly to have any one think it. Indeed, I believe he was never quite the same after the unworthy hesitation of his Church to crown his years of service with even such an inadequate acknowledgment as the episcopate. But men were puzzled then as they are now, and, while it is not possible at such a time to enter into a discussion of the ethics of subscription, it is possible to say, in a word, how Brooks looked on his allegiance to the formularies of his Church.

He loved the Church which he served with all the energy of his nature. He felt the serene beauty of its service, he knew its educating, purifying influence upon the devotional life, but he recognized its dangers. He once laughingly said he intended to move in General Convention that a rubric be prefaced to the Morning Prayer providing that "All the services in this book shall be used at the discretion of the minister." None knew better than he that the discretion of ministers must be largely increased before the laity would submit themselves to their vagaries. He looked on the Prayer Book as a charter of liberty, freeing minister and congregation alike from the tyranny of the passing fashion in thought or act. But his love for his own Church did not blind him to the excellency of the many ways by which the spiritual life is nourished in other Churches. There was no element of condescension in his ministrations in other communions. "Where Christ is, there is the Church," and "Where the spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty," were the poles of his Christian fellowship. He once said, "When Bishop Meade ordained me, he

authorized me to exercise my ministry in the Episcopal Church; *he* did not make me a minister."

To his Church then he was indeed loyal, but he believed his first loyalty was to truth. He found the Liturgy and the Creeds already formulated, and he used them as tools for effective work. He found no difficulty in so doing. They did not exhaust his faith; they symbolized it. Much of the conventional opinion identified with them he utterly repudiated, although he could and did use them as sometimes unsatisfactory statements of his own opinions but never as contradictory to them. Had he felt they were that, he would have ceased using them. But he would not be judged by another man's conscience. He claimed the right, not "to stretch the Creeds," in the ecclesiastical slang of the day, but to interpret them according to his own private judgment guided by sound learning. He admitted that there were limits to that. He approved Stopford Brooke's leaving the Church of England, but he rejoiced that a man like Dean Stanley could continue to serve it. But the limit must be found by the individual minister. He was scornful of the suggestion that men would hold on to the ministry for its rewards while their consciences rebuked conformity. He was at one time tempted to leave the Episcopal Church, not because he was uneasy in its doctrines but because he feared it might abandon the Protestant position which ensures the freedom in which alone he believed any Church could minister to America. He had been for many years the liberal leader of the Church. He weathered the storms that centred round the dogma of Creation and the theory of the Atonement. He died just as the storm centre was shifting to the Incarnation and the Resurrection. But the principle would have held him had he lived till now, that any man who, with expanding knowledge and deepening faith declared that he could with clear conscience use the Prayer Book,

should be not "tolerated" but honored. He used to say: "How can any human being know the exact significance of the words of the Creeds to the men who first used them? If that be insisted on, we build on doubt. We may guess, but then we are in difficulties. What did they mean when they spoke of God? If a man were to ask me if I believe in God, I could not give a categorical answer, for I do not know what he means, possibly something that I repudiate; but if he let me say I believe in God, I will answer, though my God may seem to him unworthy of his worship." But he did believe there was spiritual value in the recitation of a creed, for the unity to which this act witnesses is a common faith in Infinite Power and Wisdom and Love, mediated by Christ, to whom in the Creed we express our loyalty.

Another manifestation of the abounding vitality of his spirit was seen in his sympathy. One of his friends, who ought to have known better, once said that he was interested in man but not in men. This opinion was, I think, widespread, and was due to the modesty of the man, who shrank from the flattery that shallow souls thought would please the popular preacher. To such he was not genial—he was grim! But if any soul needed him, he poured out the riches of heart and mind. Only one who has stayed in his house and seen the steady stream of men and women who came all day long with fears and doubts, with sins and sorrows, can know that, great as he was as a preacher, he was far greater as a pastor. One night he was to meet a friend at a large reception and they were to return together. He did not come, and at midnight his friend started for home and met him. He explained that as he was leaving his house, a messenger had come saying a poor negro in the hospital wished to see him. He went at once, and found a sorry creature who in despair had cut his throat and then, slowly dying, had sent for the only minister of whom

he had ever heard and was comforted and, I hope, saved. On another occasion he came in late at night, explaining that he had been at a wedding. When it was remarked that it was a late hour for a wedding, he said, "Oh, it was long ago, yesterday I think, but I went to the reception and enjoyed myself so much that the time slipped away." "What did you do?" "Well, it was a colored couple, and they asked me to their rooms on Cambridge Street, and I had a wonderful time—sat in a rocking-chair and ate ice-cream and sponge-cake and talked to a dear old woman!" We are reminded of Bacon's words, "The nobler a soul is, the more objects of compassion it hath." But the love of this man was greater than compassion. He is indeed hard-hearted who is devoid of pity, unwilling or unable to "weep with them that weep"—compassion is indeed the test of nobility; but to "rejoice with them that do rejoice" is a higher test. How the joyful love of his great heart went forth to all in their joy—the child with its new toy, the youth in the "hazard of new fortune," the bride with shining eyes gazing into the mystery of motherhood! But it went deeper than that; it was the motive of all his preaching, it gave momentum to all his utterance. No one left the church without hearing a declaration of his love. He loved *souls*. He was eager to reveal the soul to itself, that it might know the joy of its Lord. It was Christ in each, the hope of glory, to which he spoke; so that deeper than the superficial accidents of life, deeper than the intellectual problems, deeper than sorrow or sin, went the word of God, who is love filling each heart with strange joy as the Christ in each is born. That was why multitudes who never spoke to him loved him.

Of his friendships with men of like mind with himself I may not speak except to say this, that I do not suppose there ever was a great man who so respected the person-

ality of his friends. They forgot his greatness because there was the give and take of argument as between equals. If advice was asked, it was seldom given, but instead the problem would be drawn out by the Socratic method without its irony, in such a way that when it was brought to light the truth of the matter was seen. I think in all his dealings, especially with younger men, he dreaded imposing the authority of his character upon them. He called no man master. He would have been shocked to hear any man call him master. The character for which in the Church's history he had the greatest horror was not the inquisitor but the "spiritual director." I have often thought that it was remarkable that with all his friends, especially among the clergy, there was no imitation of mannerism. Every man who knew him became a better and a larger man as a result of that friendship, because he became more fully himself. If Brooks dreaded the imposition of his own authority lest the individuality of his friend be warped, still more did he dread any word, however deserved, that would discourage any soul. A friend once said of some one who, he believed, had done him wrong, "When I next see him, I shall tell him just what I think of him," and Brooks cried out, "Oh don't; he might believe it true." Every one laughed at the repartee, but his face was sad, for what he felt was the horror of discouraging a fellow-man.

But there was another side to his character. With his pity went scorn, not the scorn of the successful man for the failures, nor the scorn of the man of affairs for the inefficient, not even of the wise for fools, but the scorn of humility for pretence. When the current of a materialistic interpretation of the universe was running strong, he was not disturbed. He knew in Whom he had believed, and kept his mind clear from the confusion between truth and hypothesis. He was no more in-

fluenced by scientific than by theologic dogmatism. He looked with pity on the ministers who wildly applauded one of Joseph Cook's Monday morning refutations of infidelity, as a sign of fear. He read all the great writers who made the Victorian age as great in science as the Elizabethan had been in literature, but he spoke with scorn of "the fatuous self-confidence" of those who, lacking in the humility of Darwin and Pasteur, would complacently have heard Job's scornful question, "Where wast thou when God laid the foundations of the earth?" When the pulpit was being turned into a rostrum for the discussion of the relation of science and religion, he ignored the controversy and comforted God's people, remembering the prophet's words, "How beautiful upon the mountains are the feet of him that bringeth good tidings, that saith unto Zion, Thy God reigneth."

I think it was this scorn of dogmatism which prejudiced him against the Higher Criticism, in which his younger friends were so deeply interested. Once when one of them complacently remarked that he had just finished Ewald's History of Israel, Brooks remarked, "Six volumes of dogmatics!"

But his scorn of dogmatism did not equal his disgust at pretentiousness. The Bishop who spoke of *his* clergy and *his* diocese, and, with entire ignorance of the Church's life before or since the Oxford Movement, spoke of the episcopate as the guardian of the Faith, he could not away with. He generally dismissed him from his mind with the characteristic, "Preposterous creature!"

Of the luxuriance of his imagination there is no need to speak at length. It explains, I think, the anomaly of his inconspicuous undergraduate life and his failure as a school-teacher. In the days at college he was laying the foundation of his scholarly life, sinking the roots deep into classic soil, and bathing the leaves of life in poetry, especially in Wordsworth and Browning, and,

above all, Tennyson. It was only when he dedicated his life to the service of Christ that he discovered how this rich imagination, which had been the shy companion of his soul, was now to become the glory of his mature life. In the first sermon, as in the last, the branches of the imagination ran over the wall, so that the way-farer outside the garden of the Church could reach up and enjoy the fruit so joyously offered.

This, then, was the man: loving the Lord his God as he was revealed in the man Christ Jesus, with all his heart and mind and soul and strength; loving his neighbor as himself, with all the respect and pity and sympathy and affection that he was thankful to receive. With ever-growing knowledge his faith grew deeper and simpler. He was a great revealer of God.

He might have applied—I have no doubt he did apply—to himself the words he loved so well:

“Our little systems have their day,
They have their day and cease to be;
They are but broken lights of thee,
And thou, O Lord, art more than they.

We have but faith; we cannot know;
For knowledge is of things we see.
And yet we trust it comes from thee,
A beam in darkness; let it grow.

Let knowledge grow from more to more,
But more of reverence in us dwell;
That mind and soul, according well,
May make one music as before.”

None like him shall be seen, because, like every genius, he was primarily the interpreter of his time. The time has gone and he has gone, but God lives, and a new messenger will come to prepare the way of Christ. May the new prophet have his faith, his love, his abound-

ing hope, ever renewed and reinvigorated by communion with Jesus Christ — the one power in humanity which, amid all the changes and chances of this mortal life, is “the same yesterday, today, and forever.” That was the faith of Phillips Brooks. That too is our faith, and from it grows our confidence as we gaze into the portentous future that “as God was with our fathers so will He be with us.”

WESTERN PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY

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In regard to Western scholastic philosophy of the Middle Ages, every one repeats the laconic judgment, that it is "philosophy in the service, under the sway and direction, of Catholic theology." It could be nothing else; and it seems that one has said everything after announcing this clear-cut formula. This current definition, susceptible of the most different meanings, is found on the first page of a recent book, published during the War, on the philosophy of the Middle Ages;¹ and though the author gives a very mild interpretation of it, it is offered to the reader as an abridged thesis, in which one finds condensed all that is important to know on the subject. "Scholasticism is Philosophy placed at the service of already established ecclesiastical doctrine, or at least philosophy placed in such a dependence on this doctrine that it becomes an absolute Rule when both meet on common ground."²

Now this current definition of scholastic philosophy in the Middle Ages defines it very badly, because it is a mixture of the true and the false, of accuracy and of inaccuracy. It must be distrusted, like those equivocal maxims which John Stuart Mill calls "sophisms of simple

¹ Dr. Mathias Baumgartner. Friedrich Ueberwegs Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. Zweiter Teil. Die mittlere oder die patristische und scholastische Zeit. 10^{te} aufl., Berlin, 1915.

² "Die scholastik ist die Philosophie im Dienste der bereits bestehenden Kirchenlehre oder wenigstens in einer solchen Unterordnung unter dieselbe diese auf gemeinsamen Gebiete als die absolute Norm gilt." P. 196. It represents the first and the general judgment of Baumgartner.

inspection," which by force of repetition enjoy a kind of *transeat* or vogue in science without being questioned.

To destroy the ambiguity we must appeal to history, and replace philosophy and theology in the midst of the civilization whence they have evolved. For this we must consider what results they had attained by the middle of the twelfth century in the classification of the sciences — the chief problem — and how these results harmonize with the general mentality of the epoch. (I) We must give an account of the rational distinction which writers of the thirteenth century establish between philosophy and theology, and the way they apply this distinction in their studies. (II) We must consider that in the thirteenth century it is a religious civilization in which philosophy and theology are developed and of which they are both factors, and that because of this sociological character certain relations arise between the two sciences. (III) By the light of these teachings of history, some conclusions will emerge that will show what is acceptable and what unacceptable in the definition before us, and what are its insufficiencies. (IV) These are questions of primary importance and of general concern, which we shall try to treat briefly.

I. RESULTS OF SCIENTIFIC WORK IN THE TWELFTH CENTURY

The twelfth century witnessed the civilization of the Middle Ages established in its definitive form. The struggles of kings with feudalism, the coming of the commons, the swing of commerce, the formation of citizenship, the freedom of the serfs — so many facts attest that the balance is being established among social forces. A new art is springing to life — the art of romance — and intellectual culture, always behind other factors of civilization, makes a considerable advance.

One of the most fertile results of the scientific work accomplished in the many schools that then covered the West, and chiefly the soil of France — where, as all agree, mediæval civilization was born — is that a distinction of frontiers between the different sciences is created and notably philosophy is clearly established outside the liberal arts, which it leaves *below*, with theology *above*.

It has been long supposed, and people still write, that philosophy in the Middle Ages was confused with dialectics (one of the three branches of the Trivium, with grammar and rhetoric); that it was reduced to a handful of dry quarrels on the syllogism and on sophisms. Some dialectical acrobats who in the eleventh and twelfth centuries emptied it of all content of ideas and rendered it bloodless and barren (“*exsanguis et sterilis*,” are John of Salisbury’s words), have managed to give this thesis a seeming foundation. But the truth is quite otherwise. These “*virtuosi*,” with their play on words and verbal discussions, were strongly combated; and men of worth — Anselm of Canterbury, Abelard, Thierry of Chartres, John of Salisbury, and others — not only practised dialectics or formal logic with sobriety and applied it in accordance with doctrine, but they placed philosophy by the side of and above the liberal arts and consequently above dialectics. Their writings touch the problems of metaphysics and psychology, which is matter quite different from formal dialectics.

While it hardly exists in the “*glosses*” of the Carolingian schools, philosophy rapidly progresses towards the end of the eleventh century, and in the middle of the twelfth century forms a considerable portion of ecclesiastical doctrine, which the following centuries were to make fruitful.

Now while philosophy has gained its position, the propædæutic character of the liberal arts becomes evident: they serve as an initiation for higher studies. Men of the

twelfth century take them into consideration, and the first who occupy themselves with the classification of the sciences express themselves clearly on this subject. Speaking of the liberal arts, "Sunt tanquam septem viæ," says a codex of Bamberg; they are, so to speak, the seven ways that lead to the other sciences — physics (part of philosophy), theology, and the science of laws.³ Hugh of S. Victor, Dominic Gundissali, Robert Grosstête, speak in the same sense. Here is a fact that settles the matter.

At the end of the twelfth century, the iconography of the cathedrals, the sculptures, and the medallions in the glass windows, as well as the miniatures in manuscripts, confirm this thesis. The philosophy which inspired artists is sculptured apart from and by the side of the liberal arts; for instance, at Laon and at Sens, and much more the window at Auxerre placed above the choir. The copy, still preserved at Paris, of the *Hortus Deliciarum* by Herrad of Landsberg (the original at Strasburg was burnt during the bombardment) places philosophy in the centre of a rose with seven lobes disposed around it.⁴

Just as the twelfth century clearly distinguishes the liberal arts from philosophy, so it established a complete separation between philosophy and theology. The establishment of this doctrine of scientific methodology is of the highest importance in the study in which we are engaged. The question of the existence of philosophy distinct from theology is, for philosophy, a matter of life or death, and we do not fear to say that it is definitely answered. But here also there are historical stages, and their study is fertile in teaching. The Middle Ages, in

³ "Ad istas tres scientias (phisica, theologia, scientia legum) paratæ sunt tanquam viæ septem liberales artes que in trivio et quadrivio continentur." Cod. Q. VI, 30. Grabmann. Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode. 1909. Bd. II, p. 39.

⁴ E. Mâle, L'art religieux du XIII^e siècle en France. Etude sur l'iconographie et ses sources d'inspiration. Paris, 1910, p. 112 et suiv.

the beginning, took up the Neoplatonic and Augustinian idea of the entire identification of philosophy with theology. Thus it is that J. Scotus Erigena wrote in the ninth century: "Quid est aliud de philosophia tractare nisi veræ religionis, qua summa et principalis omnium rerum causa Deus et humiliter colitur et rationabiliter investigatur, regulas exponere."⁵ But at the end of the eleventh century, and especially after St. Anselm had solved the problem of the relation between faith and reason, the distinction between the two sciences is practically accepted; and it is easy to see that St. Anselm, for example, speaks sometimes as a philosopher, sometimes as a theologian. The twelfth century advances a step further, and the distinction between philosophy and theology becomes one of its characteristic declarations. A codex of Regensburg of the twelfth century clearly distinguishes philosophers, "humanæ videlicet sapientiæ amatores," from theologians, "divinæ scripturæ doctores."⁶

I know well that besides these texts there are others in which philosophy is abused or misunderstood; that reactionary minds, narrow theologians or disdainful mystics, condemned profane knowledge as useless, or if they admitted philosophy, reduced it to the rank of a vassal and a serf of theology. In the eleventh century Otloh of St. Emmerau forbade the study of it to monks; they, he said, having renounced the world, must occupy themselves only with divine things. Peter Damien wrote of dialectics, that if sometimes (quando), by way of exception, it is allowed to occupy itself with theological matters and with mysteries of divine power (*mysteria divinæ virtutis*), it should renounce all spirit of independence, for that would be arrogance, and like a servant place itself at the service of its mistress, theology:

⁵ De divina prædestinatione, I, 1 (Patrol. lat. t. 122, 357-358).

⁶ Grabmann. Op. cit., I, 191. Cod. XII, 1. No. 14401.

Velut ancilla dominæ quodam famulatus obsequio subservire.⁷

Here for the first time this famous phrase is used. It is repeated in the twelfth century by a compact group of so-called rigorist theologians — Peter of Blois, Stephen of Tournai, Michael of Corbeil, and many others. The lofty mystics of the convent of St. Victor at Paris — Walter and Absalom of St. Victor — went so far as to say that philosophy is the devil's art, and that theologians who used it were "the labyrinths" of France.

But one must not forget that these detractors of philosophy were a minority, just as quibbling dialecticians formed an exceptional category, and that already in the eleventh and the twelfth century the best minds refused the unhappy phrase of Damien. St. Anselm had disavowed it. The Chartrains, John of Salisbury, Alan de Lille, expressly oppose it, or show by their writings that they reject it. Moreover, the speculative theologians who appeared at the beginning of the twelfth century and almost immediately formed three great schools — Abelard, Gilbert de la Porrée, Hugh of St. Victor — condemned these rigorous and timid writers, and the apologetic which they created (of which we shall speak further on) is the counterpoise to the tendencies of Damien. Peter Lombard himself, in spite of his utilitarian and practical point of view, rises up against such excessive pretensions. The formula is condemned by the majority of intellectual philosophers and theologians. Hence those are very unjust to philosophers of the twelfth century and the Middle Ages who follow the doctrines of a minority against which the best openly rebel. To go to the origin of the formula that philosophy is the slave of theology is to do it justice.

These considerations were necessary to raise the philosophy of the Middle Ages from that grave contempt which

⁷ De divina omnipotentia, c. 5 (Patr. lat. t. 14, c. 603).

weighed upon it too long on the ground that it had no *raison d'être* nor proper methods nor independence.

To say that philosophy by the twelfth century had become clearly distinguished from the liberal arts on the one side and from theology on the other, is to recognize that its frontiers are clearly marked. Now this great and first step by way of organization had been made at the same time by the other sciences, which in different degrees were all raised to independence. This same development took place simultaneously in dogmatic theology, which progressed rapidly, as we have just said, and threw out branches in the great schools of Abelard, of Gilbert de la Porrée, of Hugh of St. Victor, of Peter Lombard. It appeared also in the liberal arts, of which one or another branch was more especially studied in one or another school; for example, grammar at Orléans, dialectics at Paris. It was shown, moreover, in the appearance of new branches, as medicine, Roman (civil) law, and canon law. The great disciplines of the mind with which the thirteenth century was to be nourished, assert their titles to independence and their respective values; just as the functions of the king, of the great vassals, of the bourgeois of the towns, of the rural populations, are declared clearly in the political and social régime.

II. THE RATIONAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY

A great fact dominates the history of the speculative studies of philosophy and theology in the thirteenth century — the creation of a unique and international centre, the University of Paris; a phenomenon, moreover, which was in strict harmony with the civilization of this great epoch, thirsting after unity and internationalism, which had only one faith, one code of morals, one

æstheticism, and one unique and dominant conception of life.

The University of Paris, the first university of Europe, issued from the schools of the Cathedral of Nôtre Dame at the end of the twelfth century, like a flower from its stalk, by the natural grouping of masters and pupils whose number had multiplied by the incessant development of studies. Henceforth in France and, one may add, in the West, Paris monopolized the development of speculative studies — philosophy and theology — and destroyed the concurrent regional schools. Two Faculties or groups of masters interest us: that of the philosophers (or artists) and that of the theologians. The sharp separation of the “personnel” of artists or philosophers and of theologians, is one of the first signs that the distinction of the two disciplines was clearly maintained. The University of Paris only took up the methodological classifications of the twelfth century, just as one finds them in the treatises of Dominic Gundissali, of Hugh of St. Victor, of Robert Grosstête, and many others. The tree of knowledge is cut in the form of a pyramid, with the particular sciences at the base, philosophy at the centre, theology at the summit. We shall show elsewhere that all the university programmes are dominated by this grand ideal. But what is new in the present situation is the reflective and reasoned study of this respective independence between philosophy and theology.

This independence rests on the difference in the points of view (*ratio formalis objecti*) from which they regard the materials with which they are occupied (*materia*). The scholastic theory of science is dominated by that principle of intellectual methodology which a man like Henri Poincaré would revive. In every science it is necessary to distinguish the things (*materia*) with which it is occupied from the point of view (*ratio formalis*

objecti) from which it contemplates them; and this point of view, which is the special good of each science, is always an aspect which the mind takes by way of abstraction in respect to the material. Thus the point of view of anatomy is not that of physiology; for though the two sciences are both occupied with the same matter—the human body—the first is only interested in the description of the organs, the second in that of the functions. Whence it follows that for the scholastics the distinction between the two sciences rests only on the divergence of their points of view, and the fact that they are occupied with materials with which at the same time other sciences are occupied is without influence. Physiology and anatomy, according to this theory, are as distinct as astronomy and civil law; in spite of there being, in the first group, a community of matters studied (the human body) which does not exist in the second group (stars and human actions). With this in mind, we can understand the declaration with which Thomas Aquinas opens his two *Summæ* on the *raison d'être* of theology outside the philosophical sciences (*præter philosophicas disciplinas*) and its distinction from philosophy. “It is diversity in the point of view of knowledge (*ratio cognoscibilis*) which determines the diversity of sciences. The astronomer and the physicist establish the same conclusion, that the earth is round; but the astronomer uses mathematical arguments abstracted from matter, while the physicist, on the other hand, uses arguments drawn from the material condition of bodies. Nothing then prevents the same questions with which the philosophical sciences are occupied, so far as they are known by the light of natural reason, being studied at the same time by another science, in the measure that they are known by revelation. Thus theology, which is occupied with sacred doctrine, differs in kind from *théodicée*, which is part of philosophy.”⁸

⁸ *Summa theologica*, 1^a Pars, q. I, Art. 1.

A contemporary of St. Thomas, Henry of Ghent, also maintains, in the beginning of his *Summa Theologica*, this doctrine, accepted by all the intellectuals of the time: "Theology is a special science. Though theology is occupied with certain questions touched on by philosophy, theology and philosophy are none the less distinct sciences, for they differ in the aim pursued (*sunt ad aliud*), the processes (*per aliud*), the methods (*secundum aliud*). The philosopher consults only reason; the theologian begins by an act of faith, and his science is directed by a supernatural light. "Adhuc philosophus considerat quaecumque considerat, ut percepta et intellecta solo lumine naturalis rationis; theologus vero considerat singula ut primo credita lumine fidei, et secundo intellecta lumine altiori super lumen naturalis rationis infusa." ⁹

It is easy to show that such principles were fully applied in the thirteenth century. Philosophers reasoned on the origin of ideas, on human liberty, on change, on the finality of nature, on the relations between will and knowledge, with many other arguments of the rational order. One would seek in vain a religious veneer or a theological *arrière pensée* to the solutions given, were it only for the reason that many come from Aristotelianism. Theologians discuss the holy Trinity, Redemption, the supernatural end of man, etc., and invoke the Scriptures. When certain matters are common to the two orders of study, as the existence and the nature of God, the point of view under which the philosophers and the theologians discuss them differs. Their arguments meet, like the rays of light which set out from distinct foci and are received on the same screen; but they are no more confused than — in our comparison — the luminous sources are confused. This is why numerous philosophic systems could arise, remarkable explanations of the world

⁹ *Summa theologica*, Art. VII, q. 1, Nos. 10-13.

and of life, capable of being judged and set forth as one sets forth and judges the philosophy of an Aristotle, of a Plato, of a Descartes, or of a Kant.

It is important to note that this distinction was universally recognized by men of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries; and a proof that the public itself judged so is in the celebrated painting by Traini preserved in the Church of St. Catherine of Pisa, where the great artist of the fourteenth century has symbolized in drawing and in color all the intellectual movements of the time. What interests us especially in this picture, called the *Triumph of St. Thomas*, is the diversity of the sources by which the master is inspired, as he sits upon a golden throne in the centre of the composition, the *Summa Theologica* open on his knees. From the top of the picture Christ sends upon him rays of light, reflected by six sacred personages—Moses, the Evangelists, St. Paul—placed in a semicircle; then, further, by Plato and Aristotle arranged on the two sides on the same plan. Waves of brightness spread the doctrines over the world, whilst Averroës, in the attitude of one conquered, lies at the Saint's feet. This synthetic picture is a striking résumé of intellectual speculation in the thirteenth century, and gives the impression it made on men like Traini, who was placed in a position enabling him to see the master-lines. It teaches us that theology and philosophy occupy different planes, but subordinated like the personages who symbolize the one and the other; it shows us that both are joined, and complete each other in the work of a famous thinker whom the contemporaries of Traini called "doctor eximius." Moreover, the writers of the Renaissance and the Reform, so curt in treating of the Middle Ages, have clearly distinguished the scholastic theologians and the scholastic philosophers, reserving rather for the latter the name of scholastics: "Cum vero duplicem eorum differentiam

animadvertamus theologos alios, alios philosophos, quamquam illis hoc nomen potius tributum sit." This judgment, which I borrow from the treatise *De doctoribus scholasticis* of Busse, 1676,¹⁰ is confirmed by Binder Tribbechovius, and by all those who belong to that curious category of detractors and insulters of scholasticism, on whom Rabelais and so many others have founded their sarcasms. These "distributers of injuries" are better advised than some of our contemporary historians, for whom the speculation of the Middle Ages is a chaos, a hodge-podge of philosophy and theology, and who make the history of mediæval philosophy a department of the history of religions.

Not to understand the fundamental distinction between the order of nature and that of grace, between the rational conception of the world and the systematization of revealed dogmas, would be to misunderstand the speculative work of the Middle Ages, and to substitute arbitrary conceptions for the indisputable declarations of its greatest doctors.

III. THE RELIGIOUS SPIRIT OF THE EPOCH

The freedom of philosophy from dependence on theology rests then on solid methodological grounds. But while philosophy and theology are objects of speculation, we must not forget that both are living things and a function of the civilization in which they appear, the effects of which they feel. Hence they are marked by a whole series of sociological characteristics, and one of these characteristics is that they are both touched, but one more than the other, by the religious spirit.¹¹

¹⁰ Tribbechovius, *De doctoribus scholasticis et corrupta per eos divinarum humanarumque rerum scientia*. Giessen. 1665.

¹¹ I am preparing a new book on the sociological character of the mediæval philosophy. It will be a complement to my *Histoire de la Philosophie Médiévale*, of which subsequent to the English translation (Longmans, 1909) a fourth French (1912), a German (1913), and an Italian edition (1914) have been issued.

Could it be otherwise in an epoch in which Catholicism leaves its mark on all civilization? To judge of this impression it is not enough to turn to the *Golden Legend*, or the Apocryphal Gospels, which furnished food for the piety of the people. It is not enough to collect popular superstitions, the charges of satirists and preachers, the stories of Cæsar of Heisterbach. It is not enough to note the excesses caused by the veneration of relics, the conflicts between abbots and bishops, the bourgeois of the towns and the feudalists, whom material interests divided. These many oddities pale before the grand fact that the Catholic religion is the inspirer of the social state to the bottom of its structure, is the regulator of its morals, of its art, and of its thought. Statesmen the most individual — Philip Augustus or St. Louis in France, Simon de Montfort or Edward I in England, Frederick II or Rudolph of Habsburg in Germany, Ferdinand of Castile — all recognized the Catholic Church as the necessary foundation of the social state, even when their politics led them into conflict with the Papacy in order to shake off its patronage. The ardent faith which had aroused the Crusades sprang from the most diverse social strata — the new monastic associations of the Dominicans and Franciscans, who raise the level of belief and morality in the masses. Even the heretical movement that appeared in Languedoc, in Champagne, in Flanders, shows the vitality of the religious sentiment. In spite of the spirit of opposition to the Church, the century of Philip Augustus remains an epoch of Catholic faith.¹² By its dogmas and its morality Christianity penetrates everything; it gives a supernatural sense to the life of individuals, families, and peoples, who are all in the way (*in via*) which leads to a happy fatherland (*in Patriam*). In the corporation, work is a holy thing, masters are equal, art is allied to handicraft, the insti-

¹² Luchaire, *Histoire de France*, publiée par Lavisse, T. III, p. 318.

tution of the masterpiece guarantees the quality of the product. It is because one worked for God that the thirteenth century could cover, first the soil of France, then that of Germany, with gigantic cathedrals, chiselled like jewels.

There also shines out the intimate union between religion and beauty. The "*Rationale divinatorum officiorum*" of Wilhelmus Durandus, Bishop of Meude, shows in detail that the cathedrals are at once marvels of art and symbols of prayer. The church of Amiens, which was the most perfect of the great French monuments, is a striking demonstration of the æsthetic resources of the original scheme. That of Chartres no less brilliantly exhibits its iconographic resources. Each stone had its language. Covered with sculptures, it presents a complete religious programme. It is for the people the great book of sacred history, the catechism in images. Consider Amiens or Chartres, Paris or Laon. Everywhere is underlined the function of a temple destined for the masses; everywhere our looks converge towards the altar, which sums up the idea of sacrifice. The frescoes and the glass windows of Giotto breathe forth the perfume of religious life; the poems of St. Francis, singing nature, raise the soul towards God; and Dante wrote to Can Grande della Scala, tyrant of Verona, that he wished by means of his poems to snatch away the living from their state of wretchedness and put them in the way of eternal happiness. Art, under all its forms, shows the unfailing bonds between religion and beauty.

The religious spirit that penetrated everything was bound to be felt in the domain of science, and notably philosophy. We shall find this question, so complicated and so badly understood, under new aspects, in the precise relations of scholastic philosophy and the Catholic religion. In what consists the tie between philosophy and the religious medium? and how can one reconcile

it with that doctrinal independence which philosophers so fiercely claim?

Conciliation is easy for a group of ties which I shall call exterior to philosophical doctrine, and which therefore cannot affect it. They are not less suggestive of the mentality of the time, and one can, it seems to me, reduce them to three classes, which we must examine briefly.

1. The first class results from the social superiority of the theologians; and this points to the fact that philosophy is for the most part a preparation for theological studies. That theology holds the place of honor in the complete cycle of studies ought not to surprise us, when every study, whatever it was, was subservient to the clerical estate. The thirteenth century in that only continued the traditions of the previous Middle Ages. The University of Paris, issuing from the schools at Nôtre Dame, counted only clerics among its professors, and these professors had strict relations with the Chancellor of Nôtre Dame and with the Papacy. Many were themselves canons, either of Paris or of the provinces or from abroad. Not to mention the Franciscans or Dominicans, who were the most brilliant masters in the University, the translation of Greek and Arabic works, whose revelation to the West was momentous, was due to clerks of Toledo or monks of Greece and Sicily. In short, all the workers of the Renaissance in the thirteenth century are ecclesiastics.

It is natural that the masters in the Faculty of Theology (*sacrae paginæ*) took precedence of all other masters, and notably of philosophers. In this, university discipline was only the reflection of social life. It is the intensity of Catholic life which makes us understand how these "artists" or these philosophers, after taking their degrees in the inferior faculty, desire in great numbers to undertake the study of theology. So much so, that the master-

ship of arts was a direct preparation for the grades of the Theological Faculty. So documents teach us: "Non est consensendum in artibus sed a limine sunt salutandæ." One does not grow philosophy; we must salute it at the threshold of knowledge and engage ourselves with theology. It is the intensity of this Catholic life which makes us understand how Robert of Sorbonne, founder of the famous college of that name, could, in the little treatise *De conscientia*, compare the Last Judgment to the examinations for the degrees of Paris, and pursue the comparison into a thousand details. In the supreme trial for the Doctorate, the judge will not be accessible to recommendations or presents, and all will pass according to the requirements of strict justice. It is, moreover, the intensity of religious life at that epoch which can explain certain controversies between theologians which subvert our modern ideas, like that on the subject of Christian perfection. While ordinary people are enthusiastic for religion simple and strong, the learned at Paris strove to know if the life of the regulars is nearer to perfection than that of seculars. Between 1255 and 1275 all doctors were obliged to declare themselves on this question. Certain secular masters treated it with an asperity and a passion which served as an outlet to their ill-humor against the Dominicans and Franciscans, whom they never forgave for having taken the three chairs in the Faculty of Theology. The religious themselves had similar discussions, and there is no more curious witness to this sort of jealousy than certain artistic works in the fourteenth century, as the Last Judgment of Fra Angelico, the Dominican, where we see some Friars Minor tumbling down to hell, while the Dominicans are received into Paradise.

If, for all these social and religious reasons, more credit, honor, and importance have been granted to theology and to religious discussions than to philosophy, the fact can

alter nothing regarding the position of philosophy, which remained what alone it can be — a synthetic study of the world by the sole data of reason.

2. The second class of ties results from the penetration of philosophy into speculative theology, and from its being constituted an apology for Christianity. The penetration affects theology alone, and philosophy not at all. Such was in fact this method, dear to the masters of Paris and called, currently but improperly by modern authors, the dialectic method in theology. We already know that speculative theology, to which the thirteenth century gave its brightest glory, is the coördination of Catholic dogma, and therefore its chief method is, and can only be, the authority of the sacred books. But by the side of this method, which is and remains the chief, theologians employed another accessory and secondary. In order to give dogmas an advantage over intelligence, they seek to show their well-founded reasonableness, as Jewish theologians had done in the days of Philo and Arabic theologians with the Koran. Abelard, Hugh of St. Victor, and Gilbert de la Porrée, in the twelfth century, founded this apologetic method, which attained greatest extension in the thirteenth. The same Thomas Aquinas, from whom we have learned to distinguish philosophy from theology, wrote on this subject, "If theology borrows from philosophy, it is not because it needs its help, but to place in a livelier light the truths it teaches."¹³

To apply philosophy to theology is what I call using apologetics. And as the application of mathematics to astronomy affects only astronomy, so the application of philosophy to theology affects theology. On this historical point, which I have long struggled to establish,

¹³ "Ad secundum dicendum quod hæc scientia accipere potest aliquid a philosophicis disciplinis, non quod ex necessitate eis indigeat, sed ad majorem manifestationem eorum quæ in hac scientia traduntur." (I^a, I, 2, 5.)

writers of the thirteenth century support me, for they distinguish the two theological methods of authority and reason, "*autoritates et rationes.*"

It clearly results from this that the use of philosophy for theological ends arises by the side of pure philosophy, while this remains what it is. If one refers to the religious mentality of the thirteenth century, one understands how these applications of philosophy to dogma led away many minds, so that most philosophers became theologians, and mediæval apologetics rose under the most varied forms. In a social state like that of the thirteenth century, where heresies themselves sprang from an excess of religious zeal and under color of purifying belief, no one dreamed of opposing dogma but explained it in all sorts of fashions. The wisest, following the traditions of Anselm and of the Victorines, posited a reserved domain, the domain of mystery, for the advantage of theology. St. Thomas does not allow philosophy to demonstrate mystery, and only authorizes it to establish that mystery contains nothing irrational. Duns Scotus goes further, and for fear of a conflict withdraws from the empire of reason every theological question. But others did not follow these wise lessons. Raymund Lulli, as formerly Abelard, wished to support all the contents of revelation by syllogisms; Roger Bacon confused philosophy with apologetics. Mediæval rationalism, contrary to modern rationalism, which wishes to deny dogma in the name of reason, vindicates for reason the power of demonstrating dogma in every way.

Where does the profoundly religious spirit of mediæval speculation shine out better than in these rash attempts? It was religious even to folly, for there is no other word to characterize a third attitude, that of the Latin Averroists, who troubled so deeply the University of Paris in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Not wishing to deny either the Catholic faith or the compact mass of

philosophical doctrines in flagrant contradiction with this faith, they proclaimed the astonishing device of a double truth: "What is true in philosophy," said they, "may be false in theology, and vice versa."

Whatever be these different attitudes and the religious care which inspired them, the result was this pedagogic consequence — that the theologian, to make his apologetic application, would take up a crowd of philosophical questions; and as no science more than philosophy is stamped with the impress of him who treats it, each theologian kept and developed his philosophic tone of mind. Then, moreover, he experienced again the attraction of philosophic problems, or he had to refresh the memory of his hearers — "propter imperitos," says Henry of Ghent — and in both cases he made deep and prolonged incursions into the ground reserved to philosophy; so that philosophical work was at the same time used in the Faculty of Arts and in the Faculty of Theology, with disinterested preoccupation in the first and with apologetic in the second. This is the simple explanation of that deductive phenomenon peculiar to the Middle Ages which has perplexed historians so much — the mixture of matters philosophical and theological in the *Summa*, the quodlibeta, the quæstiones disputatæ, in almost all mediæval works. To consider only the title of *Summa Theologica* given to their chief works by Alexander of Hales, St. Thomas, Henry of Ghent, one would think they were large books in which philosophy had no share. Let there be no deception. Real treatises of pure philosophy are in these vast compositions. It will be enough in the work of St. Thomas to cite questions 75 to 90 (Prima pars) and the beginning of the Prima Secundæ, which respectively form easily detachable treatises of psychology and ethics.

3. The religious mentality of the time created a third class of ties, existing, not between philosophy and the-

ology, but between the subjective intentions of philosophers and the end to which they subordinated all their studies, which is no other than that of attaining happiness. The eye of all was fixed on the future life. As Dante wrote the Divine Comedy "to snatch the living from the state of wretchedness and to lead them to the state of happiness," so also the intellectuals of the thirteenth century refer their researches, whatever they are — astronomy, mathematics, the science of observation, and philosophy also — to their personal striving for Christian happiness. There was here no difference between them and painters, sculptors, or architects, who also worked for the glory of God and their own salvation, or even princes and kings, who were all moved by the desire of avoiding hell and of meriting heaven, and who did not conceal this in their official acts. But these intentions stood apart from their moral consciousness, and changed in no respect either the politics of kings or the beauty of works of art or the value of philosophical systems. Scholastics would have applied to their case the famous distinction of "*finis operis*" (or the work itself) and "*finis operantis*" (or the intention with which it was done).

To sum up: Neither the social superiority of theologians nor the constitution of theological apologetics nor the religious intentions of men of study were obstacles to the independence of philosophy.

4. There is a last class of ties of which it remains to speak, which touches very nearly on philosophic doctrine itself — the prohibitive or negative subordination of philosophy to theology. Profoundly convinced that Catholic dogma is the expression of the infallible word of God; convinced, on the other hand, that the truth cannot overthrow the truth, without overthrowing the principle of contradiction and involving all certainty in this ruin, the scholastics drew this conclusion — that philo-

sophical doctrine is forbidden to contradict theological doctrine.

To understand the precise meaning of this prohibition we must note: (a) That it is based on the law of the solidarity of truth. Truth cannot contradict truth. Music, which depends on the application of mathematical principles, writes St. Thomas, cannot go against those principles, and is not disquieted about their foundation; that is not its affair. Supposing the fact of a revelation — and in the heart of the Middle Ages no one doubted it — the attitude of scholastics is logical. Henry of Ghent wrote very precisely: "If we admit (supposito) that theological doctrines are true, we cannot admit that other doctrines can contradict them."¹⁴

(b) We must note further that it is a prohibition to contradict and not a command to demonstrate. Thus a statute of the Faculty of Arts of 1272 enjoins on artists not to "determinare contra finem," but does not tell them to "determinare pro fide."¹⁵ No one applied this precept with greater broadness of view than Thomas Aquinas, and his famous doctrine on the eternity of the world furnishes a proof. The Bible teaches that God created the world in time. St. Thomas does not put the thesis that the world is eternal; that would be to contradict the dogma; but he goes so far as to say that its eternity would not be in opposition to its contingency, and thence that the idea of an eternal creature is not contradictory.

(c) It must be noted finally that this prohibition only touches philosophy on a *restricted* side of its teaching, for it holds only in regard to matters expounded at the

¹⁴ "Supposito quod hinc scientiæ non subjacet nisi verum . . . supposito quod quæcumque vera sunt iudicio et auctoritate hujus scientiæ . . . his inquam suppositis, cum ex eis manifestum sit quod tam auctoritas hujus scientiæ quam ratio . . . veritati innititur et verum vero contrarium esse non potest, absolute dicendum quod auctoritati hujus scripturæ ratio nullo modo potest esse contraria." S. Theol. X, 3, No. 4.

¹⁵ Chartularium Univers. Parisiensis, ed. Denifle et Chatelain, I, 499.

same time by philosophy and theology. The statement has no weight where the two domains are not in question.

Having pointed out the theory of the scholastics on the subordination of philosophy to theology, we may discuss its value, and see if a like prohibition, however limited, trammels philosophical liberty. The answer would be different according as one accepts Christianity or not, and according to the meaning one gives to revelation. It is not this question that interests us here but a historical problem, and that brings us back to the point whence we set out.

IV. PUT TO THE TEST

The preceding considerations allow us to appreciate at its just value the current definition which served as a beginning of this study, and which Dr. Baumgartner reproduces at the head of his new edition.

First, one can say of scholastic philosophy that it is a philosophy of religious inspiration, in this very general sense, that it was evolved in a social atmosphere of which religion was the inspiring sovereign; that under the influence of this mentality theological studies enjoyed a social consideration superior to that which was granted to philosophical studies; that the neighborhood of faculties — theology and philosophy — introduced this curious mania for mixing — but not confusing — in the same book, philosophical and theological questions; finally, that in the order of moral intentions philosophy was regarded by the intellectuals of the Middle Ages as a preliminary step towards happiness. But this religious inspiration affects all the other activities that make up the civilization of the thirteenth century — politics, art, morals, family, work. The religious inspiration is a sociological characteristic by the side of many others;

but precisely because this characteristic belongs to civilization, it belongs to all its factors and is not peculiar to philosophy, which is only one factor. Hence it is not sufficient for the definition or judgment of philosophy. One could as well think of understanding the oak by describing the chemical and geological nature of the soil where it grows together with the elm, the beech, and other forest trees. One can understand that historians who study expressly the civilization of the Middle Ages, like Mr. Henry O. Taylor in his remarkable work, *The Mediæval Mind*, should criticise in the scholastic philosophy of the thirteenth century only its dominant preoccupation with salvation, which takes the lead of all subjects, and should think this its sufficing characteristic.¹⁶ But that works treating solely of the historical evolution of doctrines should be content with such a superficial judgment, seems to me inadmissible.

Besides the general criticism we have just made of this definition on the ground of insufficiency, some special criticisms come to mind as conclusions from the preceding study.

Scholasticism, they say, is "philosophy placed in the service of already established ecclesiastical doctrine." No. To place philosophy in the service of theology is to use apologetic; and apologetic, which proposes to show the rational character of dogmas fixed beforehand, comes from scholastic theology and not from scholastic philosophy. To define, according to the energetic idea of Aristotle, is to say what a thing is. Baumgartner-Ueberweg defines scholastic philosophy saying what it is not.

Is scholasticism then philosophy placed in such a dependence as to follow theology by absolute rule? Their ground is common. Yes; but the question is whether this limitation is enough to constitute a complete definition, and one that we have a right to expect

¹⁶ *The Mediæval Mind*, C. II, chapter 35.

in Dr. Baumgartner's work; and we answer in the negative. In the first place, because the limitation simply places boundaries or limits beyond which one cannot pass. It does not treat of what is beyond, or of a considerable number of philosophical doctrines in which theology is not interested, but in which Dr. Baumgartner's definition should be interested. To define is not only to trace the boundary where the territory stops, but it is to penetrate the territory itself.

We object further, because this limitation does not establish any doctrinal content, but simply forbids contradiction. It can only therefore establish a negative — that is to say, an imperfect — definition of philosophical doctrine, which is the thing itself to be defined. The strange thing is that Dr. Baumgartner does not deny this. He admits, in the notes or in some brief parts of his text, that scholastic philosophy extends to vast departments that do not enter the kingdom of theology.¹⁷ But he refuses to take account of them in his definition. Hence he excludes what is essential; he leaves out precisely what ought to be found there; he rests on a side-issue; he repeats barren formulas, and he perpetuates prejudices.

¹⁷ Even Mr. Henry O. Taylor recognizes that scholastic philosophers are devoted to the pursuit of knowledge for itself. Besides the joy of working for their salvation they have the joy of study. Men like Roger Bacon, Albertus Magnus, St. Thomas, could not have done what they did, says he, without the love of knowledge in their souls.

BOOK REVIEWS

BOOKS ON THE OLD TESTAMENT AND JEWISH THEOLOGY:

THE HOLY SCRIPTURES ACCORDING TO THE MASORETIC TEXT. A New Translation. The Jewish Publication Society of America. 1917. Pp. xv, 1136. \$5.00.

THE STORY OF BIBLE TRANSLATIONS. MAX L. MARGOLIS. The Jewish Publication Society of America. 1917. Pp. 135.

THE TEXT OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. É. NAVILLE, D.C.L., LL.D., D.LITT., F.S.A. Oxford University Press. 1916. Pp. vi, 82. \$1.20.

JEWISH THEOLOGY. K. KOHLER. The Macmillan Co. 1918. Pp. xiii, 505. \$2.50.

As long ago as 1892 the Jewish Publication Society of America took the initial steps towards an English translation of the Bible, assigning the several books to individual scholars in America and Great Britain, with the expectation of bringing these independent translations into unity through the labors of an editorial committee and by correspondence with the authors. Considerable progress was made in the work on this plan; but as time passed it became evident that the scheme was impracticable, and accordingly in 1908 a board of editors selected by the Jewish Publication Society and the Central Conference of American Rabbis was formed, by whom the work should be done in coöperation. Of this Editorial Board, Dr. Cyrus Adler was the chairman, and Professor Max L. Margolis editor-in-chief and secretary of the Board.

The results of their labors, extending over a period of nine years, are embodied in the volume before us; and the first obligation of the reviewer is to congratulate the editors upon the successful accomplishment of their task.

The translation properly follows the Masoretic text and the order of the books in the three parts of the Hebrew Bible. In only a few instances the Ketib is preferred to the prescribed marginal reading (Kere). The translators have availed themselves of the labors of their predecessors, both before and after the so-called Authorized Version of 1611. They have wisely adhered as closely as possible to the inimitable diction of that version, even when they differ from

its interpretation. In this respect they have been more conservative than the American revisers of 1885 and the editors of the so-called "Standard American Edition" of 1901. They have, of course, followed the unbroken tradition of the versions from the Septuagint on in substituting "the Lord" for the Tetragrammaton which the American revisers print "Jehovah." They have also recognized that in a version intended for popular use the multiplication of marginal notes, offering the unlearned reader his choice of variant readings in the text or versions and various renderings of Hebrew words between which the learned decline to decide, is out of place.

The names of the editors — Schechter, Kohler, Philipson, Schulman, Adler, Jacobs, Margolis — are assurance that the work has been done by as competent scholars as there are in America, and an examination of the translation which they have produced fully confirms the favorable expectation which the constitution of the Editorial Board creates. It may be affirmed without fear of contradiction that they have given English-reading peoples the best version of the Old Testament in existence, one distinctly superior to the revision of 1885 in either its British or American form. In the places — comparatively few in number, it must be said — in which the English versions have been dictated by traditional Christian interpretation, the reader will find the largest divergence from the renderings with which he is familiar; not because the editors have set up a Jewish interpretation against the Christian, but in general because they have more faithfully adhered to the meaning of the Hebrew text. A conspicuous example of this may be seen in Daniel 9 24-26, where the new translation alone renders the words of the original as anybody who knew Hebrew and had no apologetic end to serve would translate them off-hand. The Authorized Version here frankly — one might say, naïvely — embodies the Christian exegesis. The English revisers, at the most important point, followed the Hebrew in the text, but in the margin gave the reader the benefit of the translation they rejected; while the American revisers went back to the Authorized Version in their text.

It remains to say that the volume is excellently printed, in paragraphs, with an unobtrusive numeration of the verses. Not only in the poetical books but in the plainly measured oracles of the Prophets, the text is broken in lines in a way which makes its character apparent to the eye as well as to the ear.

It is to be hoped that this excellent version will find wide currency, not only among the Jewish readers for whom it is primarily intended, but among Christians also.

The second volume mentioned above may be regarded as a companion to the new translation of the Bible issued by the Jewish Publication Society. It gives in compact and popular form an account of the Targums, the Septuagint and later Greek versions made by Jews, the Syriac and Latin Bibles, the Jewish translations in the Middle Ages, the translations of the Reformation Age and succeeding centuries, and modern translations by Jews and Christians, with concluding chapters on agencies for circulating the Bible and their work, and on the difficulties of translating the Bible.

No scholar is better fitted for such a task than Professor Margolis, who stands in the front rank of students of the ancient versions, particularly of the Greek translators. The book is a pleasure to the eye, and is illustrated with a number of facsimiles of manuscripts and printed texts, which, notwithstanding their reduced scale, are admirably clear. There is also a complete index. All in all, there is more trustworthy information about the versions of the Bible to be got from this work than from many larger and more pretentious volumes.

Professor Naville is a respected Egyptologist, who, without knowing the Semitic languages or anything about Semitic epigraphy more than can be learned from a desultory perusal of encyclopædias, has propounded a novel theory of the linguistic and palæographic history of the books of the Old Testament. If a Hebrew scholar, with an equivalent ignorance of the Egyptian language and Egyptian epigraphy and palæography, should propound a revolutionary history of the text of the *Book of the Dead*—for example, that it was brought by Abraham from Ur of the Chaldees in the “cuneiform” language and writing — Professor Naville would probably be among the first to remind him, “ne sutor ultra crepidam.”

It would be a waste of time to reproduce here the theory which Naville confidently sets forth in these lectures, or to expose the blunders in the very elements into which he falls; but to Semitic scholars it may be recommended as an extremely entertaining book. It is to be regretted that a man of Naville's eminence in his own field should discredit himself by such a misadventure; and it is surprising that it should be put out among the scientific publications of the new British Academy.

President Kohler, of the Hebrew Union College in Cincinnati, was one of the editors of the Jewish Encyclopædia, and contributed to it the greater part of the theological articles. He also wrote an outline of Systematic Jewish Theology in the series, *Grundriss der*

Gesamtwissenschaft des Judentums (1910). The present volume is not a translation of the last-named work, but a treatment of the same subject in English on a somewhat different plan and scale. In the task which he set himself in these two volumes the author had no predecessors. Excellent studies exist in different parts of the field, chiefly from a historical point of view; but no attempt had hitherto been made, either on the conservative or progressive side, to cover the whole field systematically.

Dr. Kohler has long been recognized as one of the leaders of the progressive school in American Judaism, and it is from this point of view that he has written the volume before us. Conservative, or, as they would prefer to be called, orthodox, Jewish scholars, will probably regard the book in the same light in which a Catholic theologian looks on a treatise on systematic theology by a somewhat advanced Protestant. A presentation of Jewish theology from a liberal standpoint is as legitimate, however, as a corresponding presentation of Christianity. The reader must in either case keep the standpoint in mind.

The three main divisions of the subject are "God" (God as he makes himself known to Man; the Idea of God in Judaism; God in Relation to the World), "Man," and "Israel and the Kingdom of God." The historical development of Jewish doctrines receives full measure of attention; the author accepts the main results of modern criticism and makes free use of the investigations of Christian scholars. Christian readers, who it is to be feared are in the habit of thinking that the history of Jewish thought ended in the Talmud — if they do not make it end in New Testament times — will find the treatment of the mediæval and modern developments especially profitable.

GEORGE FOOT MOORE.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THE RELIGIOUS THOUGHT OF THE GREEKS FROM HOMER TO THE TRIUMPH OF CHRISTIANITY. CLIFFORD HERSCHEL MOORE. Harvard University Press. 1916. Pp. 385.

This book is based upon lectures delivered in part before the Lowell Institute in Boston and in part at five colleges in the Middle West. In its ten chapters it covers a period of over a thousand years, and, as its title implies, it deals, not primarily with the material side of religious origins, cults, and mythology, but with the higher ranges of Greek thought, philosophical, ethical, and theological, and thus stands in a class with such books as Campbell's *Religion in Greek*

Literature rather than with Farnell's *Cults of the Greek States* or the work of writers like Miss Jane Harrison. Within such restrictions the work undoubtedly gains by the exclusion of much controversial material, yet one feels that for the general reader, with little access to the voluminous literature of the subject, a brief introductory chapter on origins (like that in Farnell's *Higher Aspects of Greek Religion*) might have been helpful.

While the lecture-form, which has been largely retained, has the disadvantage of at times making rather sharply drawn divisions of theme, it has the merit of allowing frequent and well-balanced summaries of the contributions made by Homer, Hesiod, the Orphics, Plato, and the rest, to the slowly advancing and gradually purified stream of religious thought and experience. Thus viewed, the whole course of Greek religion appears as a sort of *præparatio evangelica*, and the author well emphasizes the fact that the fundamental beliefs of early Christianity — revelation, faith, mystic union with the divine, and salvation — were presented to a Græco-Roman world to which, partly through Greek religion and partly through Oriental cults established in the West, these ideas were already familiar and welcome. The final step was for the new religion to be embodied in the garb of Greek philosophical thought, and thus Christianity was not merely the death, but in a larger sense the consummation, of Greek paganism. In this aspect, more often treated in works on early Christianity than in those on Greek religion, Professor Moore's book should prove of great value to both clergymen and others interested in the Greek elements in Christianity. With no claims to originality — and unproved views would be obviously out of place in such a work — it strives to set forth, in clear, untechnical language and with a sound sense of proportion, the essential and well-established facts. The seventh chapter, on the victory of Greece and its religion over Rome, and the eighth, on the spread of Oriental cults in the western Roman empire, at first sight appear to interrupt the course of the narrative, but each is important in its contribution to the final result, and the latter is especially welcome as a description, by an expert in the field, of some of early Christianity's more important parallels and rivals. Indeed, were any fundamental criticism to be made of this sane and readable book, it might perhaps be the wish that it might even more clearly set forth by its title the importance in its plan of that Christianized Hellenism towards which Greek paganism is seen to move.

ARTHUR STANLEY PEASE.

THE IDEA OF GOD IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT PHILOSOPHY. The Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of Aberdeen in the years 1912 and 1913. A. SETH PRINGLE-PATTISON, LL.D., D.C.L. Oxford University Press. 1917. Pp. xvi, 417. 12s. 6d.

The author is profoundly convinced that the traditional idea of God must be modified if we are to deal satisfactorily with ancient problems as they present themselves to modern knowledge in the light of current philosophy. "The traditional idea, to a large extent an inheritance of philosophy from theology, may be not unfairly described as a fusion of the primitive monarchical ideal with Aristotle's conception of the Eternal Thinker" (p. 407). Perhaps the "fusion" might be described more accurately as Neo-Platonism; at any rate, it is the aloofness which the inherited idea ascribed to God, as respects both man and the world, which is the author's chief point of attack. Beginning with Hume and Kant he finds the defect of both in the separation which each practically acknowledged between the world of mind and the world of things. From this unfortunate diremption came the division between facts and values, science and religion, knowledge and faith. Human thought tried to stand, like the angel in the Apocalypse, with one foot on the solid ground of fact and the other on the shifting sea of subjective values. Escape from this way of thinking comes by substitution of biological for mechanical categories. Indeed, the word "organic" strikes the key-note of Pringle-Pattison's book. Because man is organic with nature, the world is what it appears to be, having fashioned the human senses and brain for its own just apprehension, or more accurately for its own self-expression. Hence he says rather poetically (but to him as to Dr. Everett, "Religion is poetry believed in"), "The intelligent being is, as it were, the organ through which the universe beholds and enjoys itself" (p. 111). Accordingly secondary qualities are not merely man's reactions to an unknown and unknowable world, they are nature's revelations in man. Likewise, values or "tertiary qualities" are not purely subjective but are resident in reality. So the two themes of the first series of lectures are immanence and continuity — the organic unity of man and the world.

In the second series, the same principle is applied to the relation between God and the world, including man, which also is defined as organic in an even deeper sense. Thus by the method of restatement, a solution is found for long-standing problems. Creation means the presence of the infinite in the finite; teleology, the discovery of rationality in the world-process both in details and as a

whole; time is an aspect of eternity, and so forth. Theologically, the Incarnation is the disclosure in human terms of the inmost nature of reality; hence God is to be conceived as striving and as passible.

One is loath to criticize, but two or three suggestions may be in order, bearing principally upon method. In the Preface, the author apologizes for referring so frequently to other authors, justifying his practice by saying, "This method of construction through criticism is the one which I have instinctively followed in everything I have written." So indeed one's own thought may develope, but it does not therefore follow that it is the best method of presentation. In fact, the book proves that it is not, for too often the thread of thought is lost in the maze of controversy. Again, it may be doubted whether the writer would not have done better to be more radical in his undertaking. That the traditional idea of God needs modification is indisputable, but perhaps it needs more than modification. What is deeply demanded nowadays is a fresh start from the world as we now know it, and an approach to the idea of God unhampered by traditional methods and prepossessions. One feels that at certain points elements of the traditional idea — perhaps one might more truly say, religious feelings associated with such elements — have unduly influenced the author's thought. To take but a single instance, referring to "beings capable of spiritual response which enrich thereby the life from which they spring," he adds, "Only for and in such beings does the Absolute take on the lineaments of God" (p. 295). But this Absolute, whence comes it? Surely from the speculative tradition rather than from our world as known. If the "Absolute" of tradition and of rhetoric were dispensed with altogether, perhaps then, in Emerson's phrase, God would fire the heart with his presence.

Dr. Pringle-Pattison is an idealist according to his definition of idealism as "the interpretation of the world according to a scale of value, or, in Plato's phrase, by the idea of the Good or the Best" (p. 181). Yet in his epistemology he goes far in the direction of Neo-realism, and in his insistent emphasis upon a differentiated unity and an irreducible individuality he is at one with Personal Idealism. Possibly the most valuable contribution of his book will prove to be its suggestion of a possible combination of various tendencies of contemporary thinking.

W. W. FENN.

THE NESTORIAN MONUMENT IN CHINA. P. Y. SAEKI. Society For Promoting Christian Knowledge. London. 1916.

In this work we have an important addition to the constantly increasing literature which deals with the famous monument set up by the Nestorian Christians at Hsian-fu in Western China. There is no book on the subject which covers the same ground as the one before us, and any future students who occupy themselves with the great historical missions which penetrated to China perhaps as early as the sixth century, whose greatest memorial is the eighth-century inscription in question, will have to consult Professor Saeki, even though they may have to differ from many of his conclusions and to distrust some of his philological conjectures. For Professor Saeki has the advantage of being an Oriental scholar from the other end of the "Land Bridge" which runs across Asia. As a Japanese who knows the Chinese literature, he is able to show the place which the Hsian-fu monument occupies in Chinese tradition, and to furnish a number of incidental allusions to the history of the monument. Then he has been able to show from his intimate knowledge of the Buddhist and Taoist religions that the monument makes use of expressions borrowed from both of these quarters (as well as from the Chinese Classics), a process of sympathetic coloring which was quite proper in presenting a new religion where other forms of faith were already in possession of the field. The recognition of these already existing religious terms in the Chinese text of the inscription has enabled Professor Saeki to mark by quotation-signs such parts of the inscription as involve loans from Buddhist or Taoist ideas, and to give us the sense of a number of passages which would be otherwise obscure. Professor Saeki's translation is thus the most valuable of all that have yet appeared, and must be consulted at every point.

In the introduction prefixed to the text and translation of the monument Professor Saeki was again in a position of advantage; for research in Central Asia as well as in China is giving us back a number of documents which relate to the propagation of Christianity in those regions, including the attendant Manichæism which followed or accompanied the Christian faith. Two documents stand out as of prime importance.

The first is a Chinese manuscript of the eighth or ninth century, which is now in the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris, which was discovered by Professor Pelliot in A.D. 1908. The second is the Chinkiang inscription of A.D. 1281, of which the contents, as well as

a number of notices of Christian men and Christian monasteries, are preserved in a Chinese book of the fourteenth century. These two documentary sources are of the first importance for determining the Chinese equivalents of the Syrian and Persian names which underlie them, and can thus be used in the decipherment of the great inscription.

Now let us give closer attention to the MS. mentioned above, and see how Professor Saeki has treated it. The MS. contains a Nestorian Hymn to the Trinity (Saeki says a Nestorian *Baptismal* Hymn to the Trinity). Then there is a list of saints who are revered by the Church, to all of whom Saeki prefixes the title of *Catholicos*. A list of revered books follows, thirty-five in number, which it is said were translated by Ching-Ching, who is shown to be the same as the chorepiscopus Adam, the Persian Christian who composed and set up the Hsian-fu inscription. It is also said that a number of other Nestorian books over and above the thirty-five rolls that are mentioned remain untranslated, making a total of 530 books. Those which were done into Chinese may be taken as the same as those which Adam translated in the Royal Library, as described on the great inscription.

It is now time to be on our guard against hasty conclusions. If the number of Nestorian books is anything like 530 (a point on which I do not see that Saeki commits himself), we can only say that there is no possibility of such a number of Nestorian works in the eighth century, and that the term "book" must be applied to small compositions (tracts, hymns, etc.) as well as to longer works. Thus we should not expect a single entry for the Old Testament or for the New.

Turning now to Professor Saeki's interpretation of this MS., of which he has translated the greater part for us, we find that the *Hymn of the Trinity* is correctly described, but it is not a baptismal hymn; in fact, it is part of the regular Nestorian Ritual. We shall proceed to prove this later on by putting side by side with the Chinese Hymn a section of the *Breviarium Chaldaicum*.¹ It will be remembered that the Service-Book in question has been re-edited by the authorities of the Roman Church, and we have to watch the text for insertions, omissions, and alterations. For example, the hymn in question is probably due to Theodore of Mopsuestia, but one must not expect to find the name of that saint on its title-page. The agreement between the Chinese manuscript and the *Breviarium* shows that the Nestorians had actually translated their ritual into

¹ I owe the reference to my colleague, Dr. Mingaria.

Chinese by the eighth century. They did not conduct their services in a tongue that the people did not understand. They used, moreover, a commendable freedom in their translations; to the Chinese they became as Chinese that they might gain Chinese.

At this point we are surprised to find that Professor Saeki has depressed the date of the Pelliot MS. to the fourteenth century, a mistake which leads him into a number of consequent errors in the identification of the books mentioned in the MS. Thus we find on p. 70 at the end of the list of books the following remark: "Fragmentary as these are, they are quite enough to convince any one of the fact that there was a strong body of Nestorians in China prior to the fourteenth century." Again on p. 75: "We cannot but see that the Nestorian stone belongs to the T'ang era (618-907 A.D.), while the newly discovered diptychs are of a later era — not earlier, in our opinion, than the fourteenth century."

It follows naturally from this judgment as to the date that the identification of many of the books must be hopelessly wrong. And they are wrong in two ways: (1) because they are books much posterior in date to the eighth century, and (2) because many of them are Jacobite or West Syrian books, and would not appear in a Nestorian propagandist library. For instance, Saeki's first identification is that of a book called *Eternal-Enlightenment-Kingly-Pleasure*. This is identified with the *Lamp of the Sanctuary*, a work of Bar Hebræus in the thirteenth century! It is much more probable that the name is a Chinese translation of "Gospel."

Next to this comes a work entitled *The-Explaining-Origin-Reaching-The-Cause* (or *Root*). Saeki identified this with *De cause causarum*, another work of the later Middle Ages. It is more likely that it describes the Book of Genesis. Other identifications of wrong books and impossible people might be noted.

Now let us come to the *Breviarium*:

Chinese Text

All the angels in the highest profoundly adore Thee.

The whole earth rejoices in universal peace and good will.

In the beginning man received the true Divine Nature from the Three Powers.

All the saints adore Thee, most Merciful God our Father.

All the Enlightened praise Thee!

All who seek truth take refuge in Thee.

Syriac Text

Glory to God in the highest,
and on earth peace, good
hope to men.

We worship Thee, we
praise Thee, we exalt
Thee, O eternal Essence,

Chinese Text

Looking up we receive the gracious light,
And are freed from evil spirits that we may
seek the lost.

O true Eternal and Merciful Father!

O Glorious Son!

O Pure Spirit!

Triune God!

Thou rulest over all the Kings of the earth.

Thou art the spiritual emperor among the
world-honoured ones,

Dwelling in Divine Light of boundless efful-
gence.

Visible only (to the Saints).

For no mortal eyes have seen Thee,

Nor can any one describe Thy glorious Form,

For Thy holiness is beyond description.

Thy Divine Majesty is matchless.

Only Thou art changeless.

Thou art the root of all goodness,

And Thy goodness is boundless.

Now when I consider Thy grace and goodness
Which gladdens this country with the music
(of the gospel),

O Messiah! Thou greatest and holiest of
beings!

Who savest innumerable souls from the sorrows
of life,

O Eternal King!

O Merciful Lamb of God.

Who greatly pitiest all suffering ones,

Who darest no Cross,

We pray Thee remove the heavy sins of men;

Let them recover their true original nature;

Let them attain the perfection of the Son of
God,

Who stands on the right hand of the Father,
And whose throne is above that of the greatest
Prophets.

We pray Thee that all who are on the Salva-
tion Raft may be saved from fire.

Syriac Text

Hidden and incomprehen-
sible Nature,

Father and Son and Holy
Spirit.

King of Kings and Lord of
Lords!

Who dwellest in effulgent
light.

Whom none among men
has seen nor can see;

Only Holy,

Only Mighty,

Only Immortal,

We confess thee by the
mediator of our blessings,
Jesus Christ the Saviour
of the World, and the Son
of the Most High.

Lamb of the Living God,

Who takest away the sin
of the world, have mercy
upon us!

O Thou who sittest at the
right hand of the Father,
receive our prayer!

*Chinese Text**Syriac Text*

Great Pilot, Thou art our merciful Father,
 The Great Prophet of our Holy Lord,
 Our great King,
 Who art able to save all who have gone astray,
 By Thy Wisdom.
 Steadfastly we lift our eyes to Thee!
 Revive us by Celestial favours (ashes, fertil-
 izers, and sweet dew),
 And nourish our root of goodness.
 O Thou most Merciful and most holy Messiah!
 Pity us, O Father, whose mercy is like the
 Ocean.
 O Most merciful and meek Son (Holy One)
 And pure (Holy) Spirit who is embodied in our
 Lord,
 Beyond all thought.

Because Thou art our God
 and Thou art our Lord,
 And Thou art our King,
 And Thou art our Saviour,
 The eyes of all hang upon
 Thee, O Jesus Christ!
 Glory to God Thy Father,
 and to Thee and the Holy
 Ghost, for ever and ever,
 Amen.

The comparison of the texts is conclusive as to their interrelation. They proceed from a common original. This point being established, we can see more clearly how to identify the books that are mentioned in the Pelliot MS., for we have the starting-point found for us in the rituals, and the *Breviarium Chaldaicum* will serve us as a searchlight in making our identification, especially if we bear in mind that many of the books mentioned should be (as stated above) of small compass. We shall easily find a number of books of the Bible, and a number of sections of the Service-books.

Take away the intrusive *Catholicos* and replace it by the Syriac *Mar* or *Saint*, and the list is evidently headed by the four evangelists. At the other end of the Catalogue is a book called *Wu-sha-na-sutra*, i.e., the *Hosanna* section of the ritual. This is preceded by the service for the *Cross*, that is, probably the festival of the *Invention of the Cross*. Somewhat higher up we see the section for the Seven Sundays of *Moses* (so headed in the rituals), and these are followed by Seven Sundays of *Elijah*. In the same neighborhood there will be found a *Sutra* of the *Revelation*, which is the term which describes the *Transfiguration* in the East Syrian Ritual, and should here denote the order of the service for that particular festival.

If Pelliot is right, that we should read *David* for *Mahadad*, we have the Psalter among the books. This is preceded by the *Heavenly-Treasure-Sutra*, which is clearly the portion of the Service-book called the *Gazza*; it is too early for the book called the *Cave of Treasures*, and so on in other cases. Thus the Nestorian Rituals will give us the meaning of many of the Chinese titles.

We have said enough to indicate what we believe to be the right way of approaching the subject. It would take more space than a review can claim to discuss the names of the persons commemorated on the diptychs. Probably most of the suggestions offered by Saeki are unsound and the whole question requires re-examination. But, as we said at the beginning, the book is one of great value to Christian students of the East, and we are glad to have so fresh and intelligent a contribution from the Japanese-Chinese side.

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DANTE. C. H. GRANDGENT. (Master Spirits of Literature.) Duffield & Co. 1916. Pp. vi, 397. \$1.50.

THE LADIES OF DANTE'S LYRICS. C. H. GRANDGENT. Harvard University Press. 1917. Pp. vi, 181.

Professor Grandgent's purpose in writing his book on Dante is clearly stated in its preface: "It has been my purpose to present my hero, not as an independent figure, but as the mouthpiece of a great period of the world's history. I have attempted to trace a portrait of the Middle Ages with Dante's features showing through. At length or in brief according to the degree in which they wore his likeness, various phases of mediæval life have been first discust and then illustrated by copious citations from the mighty spokesman. Thus I have hoped to differentiate my study from the many volumes already devoted to the Florentine poet."

At first sight some doubt may arise about the logical disposition of the thirteen chapters of this book, and it is only after careful consideration that the author's method in analyzing the mediæval life, with an advance from the general to the particular, becomes evident. A short biography of Dante is the real preface to the book. Then follows an outline of the most comprehensive mediæval characteristic, its political and religious conceptions, theories, and institution, and especially the struggle between Church and State which is the convergent point of all mediæval history.

Literature, art, and science are closely connected with this feature of mediæval life, and their development is clearly outlined in the four following chapters: Mediæval Song, Language and Poetry, Didactic Literature, and Mediæval Learning. But the highest accomplishment of the mediæval scientific mind is its theology (Chap. VIII); not only because theology is at the top of mediæval specu-

lation, but primarily because it offers the only basis for a systematization of all the mediæval learning. It is in connection with theology that the Middle Ages developed their conception of the universe as a reality, and that side by side with a very fragmentary terrestrial geography they created also a super-terrestrial geography to which Dante gave in his poetry a more definite and plastic form. No less depending upon theology was the mediæval appreciation of the human activity in the world, although "ancient mythology had to be picked up with history, and the two were not always distinguished" (p. 226). But, after all, such a mythology went through a process of Christianization, in the same way that Aquinas had Christianized Aristotle's philosophy, and that the popular tradition had Christianized Virgil and other typical figures of the classical world.

Love for images and figures, for allegory, is the main characteristic of mediæval artistic expression. To the mediæval thinker, trained in considering all things visible as mere analogies of the unseen truth, to allegorize was to imitate exactly the divine method in nature. Allegory is in mediæval art what analogy is in mediæval philosophy. At this point, and in the light of these various elements of mediæval life, we are able to penetrate the psychology of the mediæval man.

The last chapter, in which is given a synthesis of the content of the *Divine Comedy*, is the epitome of the book, in the same way that Dante's biography at the beginning is its preface. The appeal to Dante's life, work, and thought is constantly made throughout the whole book to illustrate the various phases of the mediæval world, and it is mainly through Dante that we see its political and religious organization, its poetry, its theology, its knowledge of the cosmos and of human history. Dante himself is the highest representative of the mediæval temper. As a whole the book fulfils the promise of the author and satisfies the expectation of the reader.

As for the chapters dealing with mediæval poetry, Professor Grandgent is such a competent scholar in that field that it would be hard to contest any of his assumptions. I take, however, the liberty of calling his attention to a single point which seems to me to be of real importance. Although there is no doubt that the Sicilian school of poetry derived its main inspiration from the Provençal love-songs, yet, as Professor Grandgent remarks, it possesses some characteristics of its own: "Their verse is similar in most respects to the Provençal and yet different enough to suggest that it was copied in part from some intermediary, probably German, as well

as directly from the south Gallic songsters" (p. 129). As yet we have no evidence of any German element influencing that poetry. Would it not be simpler to think of local influences? This local influence may have come from two sides: either from Arabic poetry, or from the Byzantine syllabic poetry which was extensively used in the Church liturgy, and which is not so far away from the Sicilian school as is commonly thought.

As a matter of fact, the Church in southern Italy and Sicily was Greek for many centuries and opposed a strong resistance to the process of Latinization started by the Normans. In the last part of the twelfth century we find in Sicily a very remarkable writer of Greek homilies, the so-called Teophanes Cerameos, and one of his best Greek sermons was preached before King Roger in the dedication of the Cappella Palatina in Palermo. The "syllabic" religious poetry found here a very fertile ground. Sicily produced quite a number of hymnographers, the best of whom is perhaps Joseph the Hymnographer, author of hundreds of poems, some of which are to be found even today in the Greek liturgical books. Now it seems almost impossible that this religious syllabic poetry, which was so widely spread among the Sicilian Christians for so many centuries, did not exercise any influence on the popular songs which must have been not lacking among those populations. The fact is that the fragments we possess of this Byzantine syllabic poetry show here and there in its metrical forms and in the use of rhymes some analogies with the later poetry of the Sicilian school. One of the most striking of these is the form of the *ottava*, which is undoubtedly of Sicilian origin, and which is to be found almost exactly in some Byzantine fragments. Of course this is only a suggestion. I am fully aware that this problem is not easy to solve, but I think it is worthy of consideration.

The synthesis of mediæval theology as presented in Dante's poem is outlined by Professor Grandgent in a few pages, and as a whole it is sufficiently exact. Of course Professor Grandgent does not profess to be a theologian, and it is quite natural that he should miss some points; especially, it seems to me, his exposition of Dante's scholastic doctrine of free will and sin overlooks the essential point of the system.

A remarkable feature of this book is a number of passages of Dante's poems rendered into English by the author. To translate Dante's *terzine* into English *terzine* with the same number of verses and the same system of rhymes, is by no means an easy task. Professor Grandgent, however, if we may judge from these passages, is

well equipped for this work. A good many of the *terzines* we find in this book not only convey exactly Dante's thought and not "*disjecti membra poetæ*," but also the original and peculiar shade of color of Dante's words. See, for instance, to quote only one passage, the translation of the last *terzines* of the *Purgatorio* (p. 204). Of course there are instances in which the translator remains far below the original and even modifies unduly Dante's images, but almost never do we find cases of real mistranslations. I wonder, however, why Professor Grandgent does not give in their Latin original those words which Dante himself gives in Latin, and which belong in most of the cases to the Church liturgy, like the "*Asperges me*" (p. 203), and the "*Te lucis ante terminum*" (p. 362).

The five lectures on the "*Ladies of Dante's Lyrics*" contain not only, carefully stated, the conclusions of modern literary criticism about the historical identification of the ladies mentioned in Dante's lyrics — Violetta, Matelda, Pietra, Beatrice, and Lisetta — but also a very remarkable psychological analysis of the nature and the character of Love as it was conceived by Dante and the poets of the "*dolce stil nuovo*." In this book also quite a number of Dante's lyrics are rendered into English, reproducing exactly the metrical systems of the originals. They confirm our impression of Professor Grandgent's ability as a translator of Dante, and make us hope that he will give us a complete new translation of the whole of Dante's poetical work, which will be by no means a useless addition to the many that we already possess.

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WESSEL GANSFORT: LIFE AND WRITINGS. EDWARD W. MILLER. PRINCIPAL WORKS, tr. by JARED W. SCUDDER. 2 vols. G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1917. Vol. I, pp. xvi, 333. Vol. II, pp. 369.

In studying any important movement in the world's development, after due attention and estimation have been given to the chief movers in it, our interest turns to those who were less prominent but whose importance was almost as great since they laid foundations and prepared the way for the chief actors. These John the Baptists are always appealing figures; and it is necessary to study them in order to perceive the movement as an orderly development and not an unrelated outbreak. There are many such forerunners in case of the Protestant Reformation. One whose acquaintance, it is safe to say, comparatively few in our time have made, is intro-

duced to us in these two valuable volumes — John Wessel Gansfort.

He was born at Groningen in North Holland about 1420. The name "Gansfort" (in Dutch "Goesevort"; anglicized into "Gansevoort"), while belonging to the family, was apparently little used by this member of it, who was known to his contemporaries as John Wessel. He was educated in the schools established by the Brethren of the Common Life at Groningen, and at Zwolle, some fifty miles distant. At the latter he met a man about forty years older than himself, who came to be known as Thomas à Kempis, and who was then engaged on his *Imitation of Christ*. An intimacy sprang up between them, which had definite results on each. The elder man urged the younger to enter the monastic life; but though he was at first inclined to this, he finally decided against it, and eventually became a strong opponent of monasticism. On the other hand, it is said that Wessel criticised certain parts of the *Imitation*, and that Thomas accepted the criticism and changed them; so that when the book appeared it contained, according to the biography published a generation after his death, "fewer traces of human superstition."

From the school at Zwolle Wessel went to the University of Cologne, which was the home of dogmatic orthodoxy. Dissatisfaction with the lecture-room had the not infrequent result of driving an active, inquiring mind to the library, and perhaps accentuating in him the early-formed bent of asking every established habit and opinion in religion the inconvenient question, "Why?" At Cologne, though not in the University, he learned Greek and Hebrew, both of which languages were frowned upon by the ecclesiastical authorities, and in some cases elsewhere were prohibited. This made him a marked man; and constituted him a sufficient marvel to be known as "a three-language man." Here also he became an ardent champion of Realism; and, when about thirty years old, he left Cologne for Paris in order to confute at their citadel the Nominalists in the controversy then raging. "As representing dissent against current opinion and usage, Nominalism became to some degree identified with the cause of intellectual liberty and with progress and reform in the Church. . . . It thus served as a bond of intellectual interest to those who in the fifteenth century and the next were impatient with current dogmatism and eager for reform in the administration of the Church" (I, 67, 68). But after reaching his new university at Paris he discovered that there was more to be said in favor of Nominalism than he had imagined, and

moreover that his natural disposition was towards the things for which it then stood. He therefore abandoned Realism and became and remained a Nominalist.

For some fifteen years Wessel continued in Paris as a licensed teacher, or *privat docent*. He was cut off from rising to academic distinction because he never took a doctor's degree. He was prevented from taking the road to advancement which lay open to many scholars — the Church — because he refused to be ordained priest. His interests were outside the State and the Court. He therefore never attained a prominent position in the world. And this was in accordance with his scholar's taste for study and quiet. He had taken a degree in medicine and practised in some cases. Professor Miller's statements as to his success are somewhat contradictory: "It is highly improbable that he came to eminence in the science of medicine" (p. 72); "Wessel's unusual skill in medicine is beyond question" (p. 85). Only once did he step into official position. In 1477 he was appointed Professor of Theology in the University of Heidelberg. But his advanced opinions were out of keeping with those of the rest of the Faculty, and he realized that by remaining there he would expose himself to arrest by the Inquisition. Several of his friends had lighted stakes or darkened dungeons; and although he wrote to a friend, "I do not fear anything that I may have to undergo for the purity of the faith, if only there be no calumny" (p. 238), yet he was aware that there would be calumny, that is, false accusations supported by unfair evidence and proceedings without regard to justice. He therefore resigned his chair within two years and retired to his native Groningen. Here and in the neighborhood he spent the remaining ten years of his life under the protection of his friend, the Bishop of Utrecht. He died in 1489.

Wessel impressed himself profoundly as a teacher upon his generation and the following. Among his pupils were Jacob Wimpheling, Rudolph Agricola, and John Reuchlin, all of whom were conduits for conveying the forces of the Renaissance into the Reformation. Wessel was notable for independence of mind. "He presented hackneyed subjects in an original and thought-provoking fashion. The boldness of his assertions, the startling character of his paradoxes, arrested the attention and stimulated the minds of his hearers." He had "clearness of statement and lucidity of explanation." "He possessed also a very winning manner in private and in public discourse" (pp. 116, 117). But it was the epoch-making character of his opinions which appealed most to minds athirst in the aridity of

scholastic theology. He was one of the first to insist on the importance of the study of the Scriptures, and for this, of a knowledge of Hebrew and Greek. He held light that cardinal doctrine of the Middle Ages, that grace must be mediated through the Church, and regarded the Christian's relation to God as personal and direct, justification being through faith. For this reason he constantly disparaged the "means by which the mediæval Church made reconciliation with God seem in large part something to be merited by good deeds or penitential suffering or to be obtained through the good offices of the Pope or a priest." This "cut the foundation from under the Church's penitential system, belittled the value of confession, endowment of masses, repetition of prayers, pilgrimages, celibacy, and asceticism in general. These 'good works,' which formed so conspicuous a part of the life of the mediæval Church, had, he declared, nothing in them to merit salvation" (p. 133). The Catholic Church, he held, embraces all true followers of Jesus Christ in all parts of the world. The Scriptures are the final authority in faith and conduct. No prelate, not even the Pope, is to be obeyed if his commands do not accord with the teachings of the Scriptures. The Pope has no authority to impose penance. It is sin, not excommunication, that separates a soul from God. When a wise man differs from the Pope, one should stand by or agree with, not the Pope, but the wise man, who should by no means forsake his opinion to follow papal authority. Purgatory is not a place of material and penal suffering but a vestibule of Paradise, where increasing love for Christ matures the redeemed soul and advances it towards the full bliss of heaven.

After Wessel's death Rhodius of Utrecht, one of his pupils, brought some of his writings to Luther to ask his opinion as to their publication. Luther was surprised and delighted to find one who had not bowed the knee to Baal. "My joy and courage began to increase, and I had not the slightest doubt that I had been teaching the truth, since he, living at a different time, under another sky, in another land, and under such diverse circumstances, is so constantly in accord with me in all things, not only as to substance but in the use of almost the same words" (p. 232). To this happy agreement there was one exception — Wessel's doctrine of the Eucharist. To the publication of this Luther refused to give his approval, but sent it to Œcolampadius for his opinion. The latter approved it and handed it to Zwingli; with whom it became one of the chief influences in moulding the view of the Eucharist maintained by the Swiss Reformers.

The first volume, that by Professor Miller, gives the impression of having been written at different times and not being fully welded together; indeed, the author says, his studies in this field have been pursued during brief vacations. There are many repetitions and sometimes contradictory statements. Thus he says (p. 101) that it is thought the Bishop of Burgundy paid Wessel's board at the convent of Sta. Clara in the latter part of his life; but, on the other hand, "after he reached Paris there is no indication that he received assistance from any one" (p. 114). A biography should give at once the data as to the birth of its subject, that the reader may know where to place him. These Professor Miller does not give until page 42, though on page 19 he incidentally mentions the year in which Wessel was born. The second volume contains translations by Professor Scudder of Wessel's principal theological works. Students of the precursors of the Reformation are indebted to the author and the translator for presenting in so accessible and attractive a form the work of one of whom Luther said, "If I had read his works earlier, my enemies might think that Luther had absorbed everything from Wessel, his spirit is so in accord with mine."

FREDERIC PALMER.

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LIFE AND LETTERS OF STOPFORD BROOKE. LAWRENCE P. JACKS, D.D., LL.D. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1917. 2 vols. Vol. I, pp. x, 350. Vol. II, pp. 351-718. \$4.75.

Writing to a friend about reading a certain Life, Stopford Brooke asks, "Why do you read a book of that kind, and done by a relation too? One knows beforehand all that it will be, and that more than half will be of interest to the relative and none to the world." (I, 524). This, it must be confessed, is a somewhat arbitrary ruling, and if we were to follow it, we should lay aside this *Life and Letters of Stopford Brooke*. It is written by a "relation" — Dr. Jacks is a son-in-law; many of the letters are addressed to "relatives" and are of interest only to them. But there the parallel ends. Much of this Life is of interest "to the world." We could wish the correspondence had reached out to wider circles; but what there is gives to the picture an intimate touch, and the book as a whole presents us with the portrait of a man, magnetic, brilliant — somewhat Bohemian — the artist-preacher of London in the later decades of the nineteenth century.

Stopford Brooke was born in Ireland of Irish parents. There went to his make-up English, Scotch, and Welsh elements as well

as Irish — but the Irish predominated. He ever remained an Irishman in sympathies and prejudices. His first curacy was in London. This gave him a personal knowledge of the conditions in which the poor live, and helped to make him a socialist. It gave him a profound sympathy with the poor which found expression in nearly every sermon he preached. "There is no doubt that among the many causes which made him rebel against the existing economic system, this — the present lot of women — was the chief. When he spoke of the poor — and he hardly ever preached a sermon without speaking of them — it was poor *women* who had the chief place in his thoughts" (I, 280). All this had its origin in his experience as a curate.

But a curacy in London on a salary of £60 a year was not a position of affluence or influence, especially with an unsympathetic rector. Brooke surrendered his curacy. He married. This marriage brought him into touch with people of influence in the political, literary, and art world. He was appointed chaplain to the British Embassy at Berlin. It was in the days of the English Crown Princess, and he became a great favorite of that lady. She wanted him to be tutor to her son — the present Kaiser; and Dr. Jacks ventures a surmise as to whether it would have had any effect on the present-day happenings had the Kaiser been educated under English influences instead of German. The surmise is idle. Brooke failed to find that spiritual helpfulness among the Christian teachers of Germany he had expected, but he saw nothing of those characteristics which Germans have shown in recent times. His wife had truer intuitions. While in Berlin Mr. Brooke completed the *Life of F. W. Robertson* — the famous English preacher. We know the place it has taken in religious biography. It is a remarkable book to have been written by one so young and from a single sitting. Brooke met Robertson only once.

On his return to England Mr. Brooke spent some weary months "looking for a job." He had come under suspicion of being "unsafe"; bishops and rectors in the search for promising young men looked askance at him. Dean Stanley used his influence, but the Dean himself was suspect. Besides, the Broad Church party had not many "livings" at its disposal, and there was an impression that Brooke could buy himself a "living" if he would. That he did not care to do, but he took the lease of a chapel belonging to Lord Carnarvon in St. James' Square, London. It was a venture, and all his friends advised him against it; but it gave him what he wanted — a pulpit in London from which to preach his gospel. Financially

it was not a success. He did not lose by it, but he did not gain. "I get out of it," he writes, "about £50 a year; and it sometimes touches me with a kind of dark anger that after twelve years in the Church I should only be earning £50 a year" (I, 213) — and well it might. But he won for himself a name as a prophetic and impassioned preacher. It was in St. James' Chapel that he gave those literary-religious lectures he afterwards published under the title of *Theology in the English Poets*. These he delivered on Sunday afternoons. They were an innovation at the time and he was severely criticised and condemned. He has had many imitators since.

While he was at St. James' Chapel his wife died. Dr. Jacks does not tell us much about Mrs. Brooke, but he tells sufficient to show how close was the attachment between husband and wife. Brooke seemed to live in the sense of her presence, and she continued to have a profound influence on all his thinking.

Whether her death had anything to do with his final break with the Church is not shown; that break followed some years after. He had won for himself a recognized position as a preacher, and Queen Victoria had appointed him one of her chaplains. This was in a measure due to the Crown Princess of Germany. It was a great honor and secured him favor. Years afterwards he tells us in his diary that the Queen wanted to make him a canon of Westminster, but "when the Queen asked Disraeli to make me a canon of Westminster, he said, 'I could not appoint a man of his politics.' And when she afterwards tried Gladstone, he said, 'I could not appoint a man of his theological views.' I didn't care twopence about being a canon" (I, 309). Had Brooke been made a canon, we don't know what might have happened. Heretics have preached in Westminster Abbey and been elevated to the episcopate. But that was not to be his fortune; his disagreements were too radical. He had ceased to believe "that miracles were credible and that since the Anglican Church founded its whole scheme of doctrine on the miracle of the Incarnation, a disbelief in that miracle put him outside the doctrine of that Church." Besides, he not only "disagreed with its doctrine, he also disapproved of its very existence as an ecclesiastical body, and of the theory of its existence in relation to politics, to theology, and to religion." Moreover, he had "come to regard the Church, in 1880, rightly or wrongly, as on the side of the rich; and he himself stood definitely on the side of the poor" (I, 319).

These are sufficiently weighty reasons for separating himself from the Church. Pressure was brought to bear to induce him to remain

where he was; but he put it aside. He would have none of the sophistries of the Broad Church party. The yoke which lay lightly on its shoulders pressed heavily on his. His reason, his conscience, his whole nature demanded expression, and he stepped out of the Anglican Church a free man. There was no bitterness in his leaving, and none towards him on the part of the clergy. With one exception, they abstained from criticism, and Brooke after his secession never indulged in recrimination. No malice entered into the memories he cherished.

By this time he had left St. James' Chapel, the lease having expired. Some friends had bought the lease of Bedford Chapel, Bloomsbury, and presented it to him. He therefore in a measure owned his church. He retained the Anglican form of service, changing it to suit his changed views, and compiled for himself a hymn-book, which is somewhat remarkable for its long hymns — Brooke believed in long hymns. His preaching now took on a greater freedom and a greater power. It was wider than ever in its scope. It possessed a spiritual fervor and artistic grace which were unique. His biographer points out that he was not a theologian nor was he a metaphysician. He was not even an ethical philosopher; his faith had more of a mystical than an ethical basis. He did not despise morality — far from it; but he founded his belief on union with God and all that comes therefrom. What theology he did preach was Christocentric. He laid emphasis on the human nature of Christ, but he exalted the meaning of Humanity. He came under the influence of Mazzini and his "Christology became a mode of interpreting the gospel in the terms of social ideals. It pointed less to the salvation of individual souls one by one and more to the creation of a new community founded on the brotherhood of men in Christ" (I, 310).

His preaching continued to be attractive. Some few friends left him when he severed his connection with the Anglican Church, but others took their place, and Bedford Chapel became the Mecca for many kindred spirits, and some that were not kindred. He won the sympathy of the Unitarians and many of them became frequent attenders at his Chapel. Dr. Martineau and his family were among the number. Yet there was a phase of Brooke's preaching that did not appeal to that aged philosopher. While he was liberal in religion Dr. Martineau was conservative in politics, and it must have been a trial to his tolerance to have to listen to Brooke's socialistic sermons. But Martineau was one of the most tolerant of men, and he looked upon this preaching as sowing the wild oats of youth.

"Ah, well," he said, "you know Brooke is Brooke. But he'll learn wisdom as he grows older." Brooke at the time was sixty years of age; Martineau was approaching ninety (II, 451).

On leaving the Church of England Brooke abstained from allying himself with any other sect. He was not attracted to Nonconformity; he seemed to share the feeling of Matthew Arnold that there was something Philistine about it. The logical step would have been to join the Unitarians, but Brooke was not logical. While holding to some of their views he kept aloof. The Unitarians understood this. As Dr. Jacks bears witness: "A multitude of congratulatory letters poured in upon him from Unitarian clergymen; but not one of them had the bad taste to welcome him into their denomination. As individuals they offered him the right hand of fellowship, and it was a fellowship that was rightly offered and gladly accepted, for otherwise he would have stood alone. He sometimes called himself a Unitarian, but not in the sense of being a member of that body, and he greatly disliked the name" (I, 320).

As to Brooke's ultimate faith his biographer himself suggests doubts. From vague hints given us in this *Life* we might almost imagine he became a pagan. Dr. Jacks refers to a peculiar habit he had when taking the water-treatment at Homburg. "He would contrive a myth and set his own life in the midst of it; or he would call up spirits from the vasty deep, and would laugh and play and converse with these brilliant creatures of his imagination as though they were his visible companions, as who can say they were not?" (II, 555). The biographer gives several extracts from his diaries — stories of how the water-sprites, the genii of the wells, made their appearance. They were all real to him. This was not once but at frequent times during a number of years.

What does it all mean? Was it a return to childishness? The answer seems simple: it was the Celtic nature, the Celtic imagination he had inherited from his forebears, finding expression in his old age. It was a phase in Brooke's development.

But what can we say of this other occurrence? In 1911 Brooke "made the acquaintance of Rabindranath Tagore, and the two men spent some time together. Strangely enough, he never would tell what passed in these interviews. . . . All that he would say was, 'I have had a wonderful time, a wonderful time!'" (II, 586).

We have no right to want to lift the veil which both he and his biographer have drawn over that interview; but the importance given it does suggest the question, What really happened? Did Brooke surrender his Christian faith and accept the pantheistic

philosophy of his Indian visitor? Dr. Jacks suggests that "Brooke's genius was much akin to the spirit of the East" (II, 585). Perhaps had age and vigor permitted he might have evolved some form of faith which harmonized the semi-paganism of Rabindranath Tagore with his own Christian belief. But we do not like to think he lost his way in a vague Tagorism. Fortunately we are relieved of that fear. In a letter written a few months before his death, speaking of the cruel war and its problems, he says, "I was glad I was able to make Jesus a reality to you. In the midst of all these horrors He is now the one reality to me. The world was cruel to Him, and He saw unlovingness at its height around Him, and yet He said God was love, and He could leave Peace as His last legacy to His people. I do not understand how He could say and do this — but I believe He was right, and cling to that" (II, 659). He died in the faith.

He was greatly distressed over the world-war. He had always held the Germans in respect. In the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 his sympathy was with the Prussians. That was the attitude of most of the English "Intellectuals" of that period. They did not know they were the dupes of a forged telegram. But in this war Brooke saw nothing favorable to Germany. Writing to his daughter he says: "What a dreadful business this is. It weighs on me day and night. It is a shameful crime to have started it, and I am afraid it has been deliberately planned and done by Germany. I hope not, but I am afraid it is true, and I am more sorry, if it be true, than I can say. But I cannot speak of it. I had hoped we could remain neutral, but we could not have done that without disgrace and ruin afterwards. But it was not without something like agony of mind that I felt we must go to war" (II, 655).

His own grandsons entered the war as active combatants, and a letter he writes to one of them, Lieutenant Lawrence Jacks, (at the front) is a confession and a rebuke: "If I were young, I should like to be with you, fighting for all that humanity needs in the future, but at eighty-three what can I do but feel with you and give what I can? . . . The pessimists about us are turning now to optimism since the French have made so brave and vigorous a resistance at Verdun. I am glad that these gentlemen are becoming saner. It is poor work and a poor spirit to be crying woe, woe, when all of you are doing so patiently and so splendidly" (II, 663). This was written nine days before his death.

Brooke never visited America. His only son, Stopford Wentworth Brooke, was minister for some years of the First Church in Boston. Brooke himself had often wished to come. In 1894 he ac-

cepted an invitation to give a course of lectures at the Lowell Institute on English Poetry — a subject in which he was a master; but he was taken ill just as he was about to leave home, and the trip had to be given up. It was a bitter disappointment to him. "Why didn't they ask me ten years sooner?" he said. He was interested in America. In connection with this great war he held the opinion that "the industrial system would go to pieces under the shock of civil war, and he expected that the beginning would be in America" (II, 652) — a view held by many socialists.

There is much more that is worthy of notice in this *Life*. Brooke was a man of many parts. He made for himself a prominent place in literature, and he could have done the same in art, his biographer assures us. He loved art, and he surrounded himself with its works. Pictures and books were his idols. Dr. Jacks has shown us this and has shown us many other things. He has succeeded in giving us a living picture of a living man. Instead of being a disadvantage to have been "done by a relative," it is a decided gain; and we close the book feeling that it is written by an artist and by a lover too.

ALBERT LAZENBY.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICAN LITERATURE. Edited by WILLIAM PETERFIELD TRENT, M.A., LL.D., Professor of English in Columbia University; JOHN ERSKINE, Ph.D., Professor of English in Columbia University; STUART P. SHERMAN, Ph.D., Professor of English in the University of Illinois; CARL VAN DOREN, Ph.D., Headmaster of the Brearley School. In three volumes—Vol. I, Colonial and Revolutionary Literature; Early National Literature, Part I. G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1917. Pp. xx, 584. \$3.50.

Some one has said that any number of facts independently stated are little better than gossip, but that even two facts shown in their relations are history. Evidently the relations in which facts may stand to one another are many and various. Broadly speaking, when history is concerned with literature, they may be divided into two classes — relations, like those of chronology, which when once established are indisputable; and relations, like those of schools or of influences, which must always remain more or less matters of opinion. At first glance the plan of the history whose first volume is now before us would appear to be of the former character; for we are promised that the second volume will concern "Early National Literature, Part II," and the third, "Later National Literature, 1850-1900." One would suppose, accordingly, that Book I,

which deals with "Colonial and Revolutionary Literature," would chronologically begin with the earliest literature produced in America and end with the period of the Revolution — extending at furthest to the adoption of the Constitution in 1788; and that Book II, which deals with "Early National Literature, Part I," would begin at this point and end at some other, definitely fixed, before 1850. A glance at the Table of Contents will correct this impression. To take only Book I, the first chapter, entitled Travellers and Explorers, is stated to cover the dates 1583–1763; the second, concerning Historians, runs from 1607 to 1783; the third discusses Puritan Divines from 1620 to 1720; the fifth, Philosophers and Divines from 1720 to 1789; the seventh, Colonial Newspapers and Magazines from 1704 to 1775; the eighth, American Political Writing from 1760 to 1789; and the ninth, the Beginnings of Verse from 1610 to 1808 — incidentally touching on such obviously affiliated writers as Mrs. Bradstreet and Freneau. Evidently, the plan of this book is in no severe sense chronological; it is based rather on what the fashion of our time is apt to call by the name, unpronounceable in English, of *genres*.

Here we come to a difficulty. What belongs in any given *genre* is clearly a matter of opinion. To go no further, it is not any too easy to draw a sharp line between newspapers and magazines on the one hand and political writing on the other; and a glance at the titles of chapters seven and eight will show these matters chronologically to overlap in this case by fifteen fairly animated years. Nothing but a dominating and authoritative central mind could quite disentangle such snarls as might easily get knotted here. Of such authoritative control, the first volume of *The Cambridge History of American Literature* shows no sign. Nothing could be less Rabelaisian than this morally blameless work, but hardly anything since Tristram Shandy has more faithfully observed the Theleman precept, "*Fais ce que voudras*." Now when it comes to planning a history as a matter of opinion, a man of genius may sometimes be able to do so in accordance with this excellently democratic principle; but the task is probably beyond the power of any four collaborators who ever lived — for no two of the four, however lofty their gifts, would often wish to do the same thing. In that case, either somebody must do something against his will or everybody must do as he chooses. The latter alternative has apparently been preferred, with cordial kindness of feeling, by the four eminent American scholars who are jointly responsible for the work now before us.

For this they are nowise to blame. What they have courageously attempted is to direct the composition of a coöperative history, in which each chapter is independently written by a competent person with no detailed knowledge of what is to precede or to follow it in the printed volume. A number of such attempts have previously been made in English. To go no further, this was the effort of the late Mr. Justin Winsor in bringing to light the Memorial History of Boston, and the Narrative and Critical History of America. He was a man of dominant personality, and he chose good people to write his chapters; but no one has ever been heard to wax enthusiastic over the result of his labors. This was the effort, as well, of the late Lord Acton, when he planned *The Cambridge Modern History*. Lord Acton is said to have been the most thorough master of modern history in all Europe during his later years. He was by blood and by training almost equally English and German. He was at once a devout Roman Catholic and a conscientious Liberal. There was never more honest, more earnest, more energetic, or more accomplished and learned a man. Yet even the main plan of his volumes, which he never lived to see published, is often perplexing. The confusion which pervades their pages may perhaps be held due to his premature death. Competent as the committee was which took up his task, they could not but lack the dominant precision of his unique individuality. There is reason to think, however, that even if he had directed the work from beginning to end it could hardly have been much else than it is — a collection of monographs widely differing in merit and supplemented by variously complete and authoritative bibliographies. *The Cambridge History of English Literature*, which presently followed, under the supervision of a committee headed by the Master of Peterhouse, Sir Adolphus Ward, confirms the impression that where Winsor failed, and even Acton, no group of men can reasonably hope to succeed. Just imaginably, a coöperative history which should confine itself to incontestable relations of fact, such as chronology, might, if executed with German docility, be of value to others than its publishers. No coöperative history which strays into the regions of opinion can possibly result in anything but confusion worse confounded. One might as well try to square the circle.

Clearly, however, a succession of monographs, loosely related but supplemented by bibliographies, may have considerable merits or faults as a matter of detail. It may therefore be worth our while to examine the first Book, of which seven of the nine chapters have already been specified; if this justifies itself in detail, its inevitable

lack of unity and coherence may be forgiven. The first chapter, by Mr. Winship, devotes thirteen pages to a pleasantly cursory discussion of Travellers and Explorers from Sir Humphrey Gilbert to a Dr. Hamilton, who made a pleasure trip from Annapolis to Portsmouth in the year 1744. The seemingly careful bibliography covers fourteen pages. One lists twelve anonymous publications, said to be arranged chronologically from 1610 to 1741 — but a stray one of 1622 lags on at the end; the remaining thirteen are arranged “alphabetically by the author’s name.” On the whole, the text and the bibliography seem conceivably disproportionate, and neither has anything to do with literature proper. The second chapter devotes seventeen pages to Historians, from Captain John Smith, who has already been touched on in the previous chapter, to Thomas Hutchinson. The last page and three-quarters are devoted to Hutchinson; but until the closing eleven lines nothing definite is said about his *History*. Then comes (p. 30) this masterpiece of expository criticism: “He was bitterly denounced by Otis and Samuel Adams, and he did not show an ability to appreciate them. He left untouched some important phases of Massachusetts history, and was indifferent to social and industrial changes. In spite of these faults, for which excuses can be made, he was the best American historian of his time. He treated narrative history in a philosophical manner and with simple and natural sentences whose charm endures to this day.” Of the five-page bibliography appended to this chapter, a page and a half concern John Smith. Incidentally the incorrect account of Daniel Gookin on page 25 indicates that the admirable *Life of Gookin* by his descendant, Mr. Frederick Gookin — not mentioned in the bibliography — has escaped the notice of the diligent writer of the chapter. The third chapter, which is more solid, is an effort to summarize and interpret the Puritan Divines. It gives two of its twenty-six pages to Increase Mather, and one and a half to Cotton Mather, “whose passionately distorted career,” it says, “remains so incomprehensible to us.” There is no specific account of the *Magnalia* — which has been called “the prose epic of New England Puritanism.” In revenge, the bibliography of Cotton Mather, mostly condensed from Sibley, enumerates four hundred and seventy-four published works, and ten manuscripts, but overlooks the remarkable *Angel of Bethesda*, in the library of the American Antiquarian Society — a manuscript-treatise on medicine, which, among other things, indicates dim foresight of bacteriology. The bibliography of Increase Mather covers eight and three-quarters pages. In all, the bibliography of the twenty-six-page chapter

extends to forty-two. Again, there seems to be somewhere a peculiar sense of proportion.

The fourth chapter is refreshingly different. It is a pleasantly discursive and interpretative essay on Jonathan Edwards by Mr. Paul Elmer More, who is quite unable not to write well. The trouble is that while Mr. More is a commentator of the first merit, he is not disposed to confine himself to the humdrum limits of a rigid historian. A paragraph of fact would have given his fifteen-page chapter what it lacks — a firm basis. The twelve-page bibliography appended by Mr. John J. Coes looks systematic and exhaustive. Everybody will agree in hoping that it is so.

The character of the fifth chapter, which devotes eighteen pages to Philosophers and Divines, and four to their bibliography, may be inferred from the statement (p. 72) that an "attack was especially directed against the middle of the five points of Calvinism," and the fact that — so far as the index and diligent search can prove — there is nothing in the whole book to indicate what the five points of Calvinism are, let alone their order. The sixth chapter, Professor Stuart Sherman's twenty-one-page discussion of Franklin, supplemented by a nine-and-a-half-page bibliography, is the first which gives a clear and systematic account of its subject; for once, one is reminded that the human mind is still capable of purpose, order, and proportion. But the bibliography neglects to indicate the unusual merit of Mr. John Bigelow's three-volume edition of the Autobiography, supplemented by admirably selected extracts from the Correspondence. The seventh chapter devotes thirteen very cursory pages to Newspapers and Magazines, and the two-and-a-half-page bibliography looks perfunctory. This is not the case, however, with the bibliography of equal length which Professor William Macdonald has appended to his orderly but not always definite eighth chapter, on Political Writing. He has really digested and selected his list of authorities; but he has neglected to tell us such details as when the men he discusses were born or what were the general outlines of their careers. The ninth and last chapter, which concerns the Beginnings of Verse, covers twenty-three and a half cursory pages, and incidentally finds no room for Phillis Wheatley. She appears, to be sure, in the ten-and-a-half-page bibliography, but why her volumes of 1773 should be classed under the Beginnings of Nationalism, only the Maker of the maker of the list can certainly know. This bibliography, by the way, shows an earnest passion for such subdivisions as will generally put anything where you would not expect to find it.

We are forced to the regretful conclusion that whoever seeks information from the first book of *The Cambridge History of American Literature* will find little more satisfaction in its detail than in its general plan. To warrant this opinion we have been compelled to indicate at perhaps tedious length a few confirmatory facts; there are plenty more.

With the second Book included in this volume we can deal more summarily, for it presents no new features. There are nine chapters, covering one hundred and seventy-eight pages. One of these chapters devotes eighteen pages to the Early Drama, 1756-1860 — a dreary waste from which the sole lingering survival is the refrain:

“Home! Home! Sweet, sweet home!
Be it ever [*var.* never] so humble,
There’s no place like home.”

To sustain this chapter there is a highly classified bibliography of seventeen pages. As to the general sequence of the chapters, they are so arranged that Henry Theodore Tuckerman is discussed before Irving, Irving — properly enough for once — before Bryant, Bryant before Willis, Willis before Fitz-Greene Halleck, all these before Brockden Brown and Cooper, and Herman Melville before Channing and Emerson. Only two of the chapters contribute anything in particular to the subjects which they discuss. Major George Haven Putnam, who personally remembers Irving, writes of him sympathetically and systematically, but is of opinion that his *Washington* is “great” (p. 259). Mr. Paul Elmer More writes fourteen interesting pages about Emerson, and provides a sixteen-page bibliography. His manner of treating his subject may be inferred from the sequence of the running titles which occur on every other page: “Emerson’s Method,” “Emerson’s Later Life,” “Emerson’s Teachers,” “Emerson’s Spontaneity,” and “Emerson’s Dualism.” His last words are: “The world had never before seen anything quite of this kind, and may not see its like again.”

So far as the volume of which the text thus ends purports to be a history, that sentence might be held symbolically to summarize it. It closes with an eighteen-page index, confined to the names of individuals and to titles, the latter printed in italics. This index includes the name of Achilles, whose “sorrowful, chafed soul,” we are told on page 268, “walked apart by the shore of the many-sounding sea.” As topography, and so on, is beyond its scope, the index makes no reference for one thing to the colleges which were in many aspects the nurseries of literature in America from the beginning up

to the last quarter of the nineteenth century. One is irresistibly led to a suggestion. Any work dealing with literature may happily follow the old custom of placing a motto on its title-page. In case this plan should appeal to the editors of the coming volumes of *The Cambridge History of American Literature*, they may find words ready for their purpose in the second verse of the first chapter of the Book of Genesis:

"And the earth was without form, and void;
and darkness was upon the face of the deep."

BARRETT WENDELL.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF RELIGION AND ETHICS. VII. HYMNS — LIBERTY. 1915. Pp. 911. VIII. LIFE AND DEATH — MULLA. 1916. Pp. 910. IX. MUNDAS — PHRYGIANS. 1917. Pp. xx, 911. Charles Scribner's Sons.

Since our last notice in this *Review* (July, 1914), three additional volumes have appeared, carrying the work down to the word "Phrygians," and bringing it within a measurable distance of completion. The peculiarities of the editorial plan and the general character of the articles have been sufficiently described in our earlier notices. It remains to say that, contrary to what might have been expected in a work of so eminently international a character, the war seems to have had very little effect upon it. The editor is to be congratulated upon having achieved what even in times of peace is not easy to accomplish — keeping his distinguished contributors on from volume to volume. It is sincerely to be hoped that nothing may interfere with the speedy consummation of the undertaking, which, vast as it appeared in the programme, appears almost incredible in the accomplishment.

As in the former volumes, there are in these a good many composite articles; for example, at the beginning of volume VII, one on "Hymns"; in volume VIII, "Magic," "Marriage," "Missions"; in volume IX, "Music," "Names," "Nature," "Philosophy." Notable single articles are: "Jainism," by Hermann Jacobi, "Karaites," by Samuel Poznanski, "Indonesians," by Kruijt, and "Melanesians," by Codrington, to name but a few of many. As in the earlier volumes, philosophical subjects are given large room, and are treated generally from a Scotch standpoint. The long article, "Jesus Christ," by W. Douglas Mackenzie, includes the whole history of Christology, down to the "present situation," and deals with the subject from the point of view of the systematic

theologian upon a method which effectually excludes the historical problems.

There are again some strange omissions; for instance, there is no article on *Imam* and *Imamites*, and neither article nor cross-reference under *Ismaili*. It is hardly to be supposed that those who use this Encyclopædia will know enough, when they fail to find the latter in the proper place, to look for them under "Assassins" and "Carmatians." In general, a greater liberality in cross-references would add much to the usefulness of a work which, partly from the nature of the matter and partly from its peculiar arrangement, is very hard to find anything in. To make the wealth of its contents fully available, extensive indexes will be necessary, and indexes made with an intelligence which the professional index-maker cannot be expected to possess.

GEORGE FOOT MOORE.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THE HEBREW-CHRISTIAN MESSIAH. Being Twelve Lectures delivered before the Honourable Society of Lincoln's Inn on the Foundation of Bishop Warburton in the years 1911-1915. A. LUKYN WILLIAMS, D.D. Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge. 1916.

Among those who have recently taken part in the work of presenting Christianity to the English Jews, two men, members of Jesus College, Cambridge, Dr. Lukyn Williams and Dr. Oesterley, have been honourably distinguished. They belong to very different wings of the English Church, but are in absolute agreement that the most important prerequisite for their work is a thorough acquaintance with Jewish modes of thought. Dr. Oesterley showed how genuine was his sympathy with Judaism when he produced in collaboration with Canon Box their *Religion of the Synagogue*; and Dr. Williams has in this respect followed in the steps of his younger friend in the present Lectures on *The Hebrew-Christian Messiah*.

The lectureship was founded by that typical eighteenth-century divine, William Warburton, Bishop of Gloucester, who was also Preacher to Lincoln's Inn. He is best known as the editor of Shakespeare, the friend and executor of Pope, and the author of *The Divine Legation of Moses Demonstrated on the Principles of a Religious Deist*, a marvel of perverse ingenuity in apologetic. In 1768 Warburton endowed the lectureship "to prove the truth of the Christian Religion from the completion of the prophecies of the Old and New Testaments which relate to the Christian Church, especially to the Apostacy of Papal Rome." "On the right determination of the

prophecies relating to Anti-Christ," he said, "one might rest the whole truth of the Christian religion." Dr. Williams by his choice of a subject has fulfilled the first purpose of the founder; but he has wisely left Benedict XV and Anti-Christ alone. The lectures are from a decidedly orthodox standpoint, and have the rare merit of being the work of a scholar, who does not parade his learning to disguise his own opinion or the weakness of his case. The writer possesses a first-hand knowledge of his subject and a rare acquaintance with rabbinic literature. He offers a study of St. Matthew as a Hebrew-Christian author by the light of the Jewish learning at his disposal. In this Dr. Williams raises a number of questions of interest, and his book is too fresh and original not to be open to criticism. He has done too well to deserve the poor compliment of indiscriminate and general approval.

It is assumed in the first lecture that the First Gospel was written after the fall of Jerusalem, and that it is an apologia from Pella for Christianity. It confessedly supplements the Marcan Gospel. This accounts for the substance of the document from the Genealogy to the Temptation. Dr. Williams treats each topic separately, the Virgin birth being dealt with in a fair and scholarly manner, though to some the reasons for accepting it are *a priori* rather than historical: "If we were to give it up now, we should be acting not only against the evidence of the New Testament . . . and not only against an article in the Creed *which has always been held sacred*, but also in such a way as to forward the denial of our Lord's divinity." Whether the words here printed in italics are a fair representation of the original intention of the Early Creed is questionable. Probably the clause appeared not to prove that Christ was divine, but rather that *despite his divinity* he was actually born. But the whole passage is redolent of the fallacy that the acceptance of a fact on the basis of the original historical evidence for it is to be determined *a priori* by the theological consequences; and this is fatal to all truly scientific criticism.

Another extract quoted from the account of the Temptation is open to serious objection: "Observe farther, that the bodily frame of the Messiah, and therefore, if we may trust physiologists, His whole personality, was at its weakest. He was to derive no advantage from mere physical well-being. The devil was given every advantage." Physiologically this may be true; but that such an idea could have been associated with the idea of the temptation in the days of the First Gospel is inconceivable. Fasting would surely be regarded as a means of strengthening, not of weakening, the spiritual

powers. This is the fundamental purpose of asceticism. It might even be said that Satan came to the Christ when he was physically weakest but spiritually strongest. Dr. Williams is really speaking as a modern man. That our Lord was made susceptible by his bodily weakness "to such sensuous sensations as his apparent removal in space to the temple's precincts," is to use the language of the rationalism of today, and not to express the ideas of his age of the Christ. It is more probable that, during the solitude of the long fast, which in itself is represented as a time of temptation,¹ Jesus had abstracted his thoughts from the world, and that the feeling that he was hungry brought him back to the actuality of the world and the practical consideration of the work before him. The three typical temptations seem more explicable on this hypothesis.

The lecture on the Jewish sects displays wide reading and contains some interesting information; but it may be suggested that hardly sufficient justice has been done to the "liberalising" tendencies of Pharisaism, whose "tradition" strove to make the Law easier and not more difficult to the average Israelite, as compared with the rigid legalism of the Sadducees.

The treatment of the difficult subject of miracles in the third lecture is reasonable and scholarly. Dr. Williams shows that, judging by the later evidence of the Talmud, the Jews had an extensive knowledge of anatomy and diagnosis, and their physicians performed some of the more hazardous operations of modern surgery. Not all cures therefore were necessarily regarded as miraculous, though miracles were recognised. There is a discussion of the miracles wrought at Epidaurus as well as those of the Middle Ages which are attested by strictly contemporary evidence; and, while he dwells on miracles as attesting the Messiahship of Jesus, Dr. Williams does not hesitate to say: "It appears probable that God uses the human means of strong personality on the one hand, and, as we have already seen, humble reciprocity on the other, when He allows miracles to be performed among either Christians or heathen."

Enough has been said to show the merits of this book without ignoring the points where the writer lays himself open to criticism. There is a serious need of "orthodox" scholars like Dr. Williams. Not that he is in any sense a controversialist. He tells his readers what he knows and what he thinks. His reverence for his subject is as genuine as it is unobtrusive. If he edified his critical audience in Lincoln's Inn Chapel, it was by no conscious effort. He addressed

¹ Matt. 4 1 and especially Mark 1 13.

them as a perfectly fair expert witness laying the case before them; and as such he deserves a respectful hearing by thinkers and scholars clerical and lay.

It only remains to give the subject of the other lectures. IV, The Messiah as Teacher—his originality; V, The Messiah as Teacher—the Permanence of the Jewish Law (The remarks on St. Paul are especially valuable, and so is the Appendix on "A Hebrew-Christian Church"); VI, The Ethical Demands of the Sermon on the Mount; VII, The Messiah—the Son of David; VIII, The Son of Man; IX, The Son of God; X, The Messiah and the Apocalyptists (There is an interesting Suggestion that the First Gospel is intended to correct the impression that the Second Coming was to be immediate); XI, The Messiah and the Cross; XII, The Messiah—the Victor. Special attention should be given to Dr. Williams's discussion of Professor Lake's view of the Resurrection, and of the work of the Society of Psychical Research.

F. J. FOAKES-JACKSON.

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

MEANS AND METHODS IN THE RELIGIOUS EDUCATION OF THE YOUNG, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE SUNDAY-SCHOOL. JOHN DAVIDSON. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1917.

This little book represents the sort of guidance that a Scottish educationist—for Dr. Davidson is, among other things, examiner in education in the University of Edinburgh—is prepared to give to Sunday-school teachers. The topics are the usual ones—the teacher's aim, the lesson-plan, story-telling, questioning, illustration, memory work, worship, and the treatment of the miracles and of the parables. The level of the whole may be sufficiently indicated by comparing the more fundamental parts of the book with the tendency of American educational thought concerning the same topics.

Holding that religion is a mode of life rather than of knowledge, and that it is bound up with the whole of life rather than being a thing apart, Dr. Davidson would test the technique of teaching chiefly by its effect upon action, worship included. Any reader who expects him, starting from this point, to go on to a reconstruction of the conventional technique of yesterday, however, will be disappointed. American educationists who take his view of the nature of religion and of the end of teaching hold almost, if not quite, unanimously that we learn to act by acting, and that yesterday's method of attempting to control the conduct of children by means of antecedent

ideas about conduct is fundamentally deficient. But Dr. Davidson will be satisfied, it appears, with a Sunday-school lesson in which the teacher merely causes the mind of the pupil to work over, in accordance with the Herbartian Five Steps, a set of ideas about goodness — ideas unconnected as yet with any corresponding good act by the pupil. If Dr. Davidson adds anything at all to this conception of the technique of teaching, it is simply emphasis upon feeling as a preliminary to conduct. Inasmuch, however, as he would produce a habit of feeling by merely causing the pupil to run over mentally various instances of a given kind of conduct, it is fair to say that we have here no incorporation of action into the teaching-process itself.

The specimen lesson that Dr. Davidson gives in some detail is perfectly logical therefore — however astonishing it may be — when it makes the Fifth Step (Application) consist of the baldest moralizing. The lesson is "The Call of Samuel." The teacher is advised to point out and discuss ways in which the pupils "can render service to God." Let him point them, for example, to such children's organizations as the League of Mercy, The Band of Hope, the Guild of Courtesy, Boys' Brigade, Boy Scouts, etc. — organizations whose aim is not so much to learn about righteous acts as to *do* righteous acts. Let him urge that the boy or girl who unites with his fellows to help the poor, the weak, the unfortunate, the oppressed, is a true little knight of God, and may claim kinship with all the good and great in history who have served God in serving their fellowmen. He will remind them of the exquisitely encouraging words of Jesus Himself — God's ideal Knight: "And the King shall answer and say unto them, 'Verily, I say unto you,'" etc. It hardly seems necessary to show why this method of teaching is not only not likely to secure the desired action from pupils, but is likely even to disgust them with the thought of it.

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UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

A BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER. For Use in the Churches of Jesus Christ.
Compiled by a Presbyter. Sherman, French, & Co. 1917. Pp. 299.
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Prayer, for Baptism, Marriage, and other ordinances of religion, and yet varying these by the elimination of expressions regarded as obsolete or misleading, and adding prayers which are apparently the composition of the compiler. It may be questioned whether such prayers do not lose the merits of both their ancestors. The voluntary prayer in church, with its expression in modern diction of immediate needs, may be inspiring when it is evidently the out-pouring of the offerer; but when it is repeated Sunday after Sunday, its up-to-date features jar with the sense of timelessness which a fixed form gives. It is neither historic nor of the occasion, and therefore is likely to grate upon the liturgically trained spirit and to be like Saul's armor to one not liturgically trained.

Yet such a book is to be welcomed as an attempt to solve the problem of combining the needs of worship in the present with the devotional wealth of the past. It is an endeavor to preserve continuity in the service of the Church without wearing the clothes of our ancestors. The volume is handsomely bound in flexible leather with gilt edges.

FREDERIC PALMER.

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The Papers of the American Society of Church History, Second Series, Vol. 5, contains three essays on conditions at the Reformation: The Reformers and Toleration, by the president, John A. Faulkner; Recent Sources of Information on the Anabaptists in the Netherlands, by Professor Henry E. Dosker; and Adam Pastor, Antitrinitarian Antipædobaptist, by Professor Albert H. Newman. It has also an article on the trial in 1440 of Gille de Rais, the original of the legend of Bluebeard, by Professor Arthur C. Howland; a paper on Recent English Church Historians, by Professor F. J. Foakes-Jackson; and a sketch of Early Theological Education West of the Alleghanies, by Professor Jesse Johnson.